FOIAS
GROK’S SELF QUESTIONS
1. To Owen Meredith, Chief Executive of the News Media Association (NMA)
**Question**: How have Google’s AI Overviews specifically impacted UK publishers’ ad revenues, and can you provide data or case studies showing traffic or revenue declines?
**Why Ask**: The NMA’s support for the CMA’s proposal to designate Google with Strategic Market Status (SMS) and its focus on publisher control over AI content usage directly align with our ad tech claims (gross price and umbrella effects). Meredith’s insights could quantify publisher harm.
**Possible Answers**:
– **Favorable**: “Our members report a 20-30% drop in ad revenue since AI Overviews were introduced, as traffic is diverted from publisher sites to Google’s search results. We have aggregated data from 50 UK publishers showing this trend.”
– **Impact**: Provides statistical evidence for gross price effects and overhang damages, strengthening our CAT filings.
– **Neutral**: “We’ve seen anecdotal declines in traffic, but comprehensive data is still being collected.”
– **Impact**: Encourages further data requests to substantiate publisher harm.
– **Unfavorable**: “We lack specific data on AI Overviews’ impact but are concerned about transparency.”
– **Impact**: Still supports our argument for transparency needs, aligning with CMA proposals.
### 2. To Sarah Cardell, Chief Executive of the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA)
**Question**: What specific evidence did the CMA uncover regarding Google’s self-preferencing in ad tech auctions, and how does it correlate with publisher revenue losses in the UK?
**Why Ask**: Cardell’s leadership in proposing Google’s SMS designation and interventions like choice screens and fair rankings (Reuters, June 24, 2025) suggests the CMA has detailed data on Google’s practices, directly relevant to our ad tech claims.
**Possible Answers**:
– **Favorable**: “Our market study found Google’s AdX takes 20-40% higher commissions than competitors, depressing publisher revenues by an estimated £2 billion annually.”
– **Impact**: Quantifies take rate and gross price effects, bolstering our damages claim in CAT.
– **Neutral**: “We’ve identified self-preferencing but are still analyzing economic impacts.”
– **Impact**: Supports ongoing scrutiny, justifying our private action due to regulatory delays.
– **Unfavorable**: “Our focus is on future interventions, not past damages.”
– **Impact**: Reinforces the need for our collective action to address historical harms.
### 3. To Oliver Bethell, Google’s Senior Director of Competition
**Question**: Can you confirm whether Google has ceased exclusive default search agreements with UK mobile carriers and device manufacturers, and if so, since when?
**Why Ask**: Bethell’s statement that the CMA’s SMS designation presents challenges to Google’s UK business (AP News, June 24, 2025) and Google’s claim of ending exclusive agreements in the US (Reuters, May 30, 2025) suggest potential admissions relevant to our mobile search claims.
**Possible Answers**:
– **Favorable**: “Google ended exclusive default search agreements in the UK in 2024 to align with global compliance efforts.”
– **Impact**: Admits past anti-competitive practices (MADAs), strengthening our consumer harm claims and supporting barriers to entry arguments.
– **Neutral**: “We are reviewing our agreements but cannot disclose specifics.”
– **Impact**: Suggests ongoing practices, warranting further discovery in CAT.
– **Unfavorable**: “No such agreements exist in the UK market.”
– **Impact**: Challenges us to seek contradictory evidence from carriers or manufacturers.
### 4. To Tom Smith, Competition Lawyer at Geradin Partners (Former CMA Legal Director)
**Question**: Based on your experience, what specific anti-competitive practices in Google’s ad tech stack have the CMA identified as most harmful to UK publishers, and how do they align with US DOJ findings?
**Why Ask**: Smith’s expertise and comments on the CMA’s cautious approach (The Guardian, June 24, 2025) make him a key source for linking UK and US evidence, especially given the DOJ’s ruling on Google’s ad tech tying (Reuters, May 2, 2025).
**Possible Answers**:
– **Favorable**: “The CMA and DOJ both found Google’s DFP-AdX tying reduces publisher revenues by manipulating auction dynamics, with UK losses mirroring US estimates of $1-2 billion annually.”
– **Impact**: Provides cross-jurisdictional evidence for gross price and take rate effects, enhancing CAT arguments.
– **Neutral**: “The CMA is focused on transparency issues, but specific damage estimates are pending.”
– **Impact**: Supports our case for regulatory gaps, justifying private action.
– **Unfavorable**: “The CMA’s findings differ significantly from the DOJ’s, focusing more on future remedies.”
– **Impact**: Still allows us to leverage DOJ evidence for CAT, emphasizing global patterns.
### 5. To Mattia Fosci, CEO of Anonymised (Ad Tech Coalition)
**Question**: What data can your coalition provide on how Google’s ad tech practices, such as unified pricing rules or last-look bidding, have impacted UK publishers’ revenues?
**Why Ask**: Fosci’s critique of the CMA’s delayed recognition of Google’s monopoly (Digiday, June 26, 2025) and his expertise in programmatic advertising suggest access to industry-specific data on publisher harm, aligning with our ad tech claims.
**Possible Answers**:
– **Favorable**: “Our data shows Google’s unified pricing rules cut publisher ad yields by 15-25%, with specific case studies from UK news sites.”
– **Impact**: Quantifies gross price and take rate effects, directly supporting our CAT damages claim.
– **Neutral**: “We have preliminary data but need more time to compile comprehensive figures.”
– **Impact**: Encourages collaboration to gather evidence, strengthening our case.
– **Unfavorable**: “Our focus is on transparency, not specific revenue impacts.”
– **Impact**: Supports our argument for transparency interventions, aligning with CMA proposals.
### 6. To Juliane Kokott, Advocate General at the European Court of Justice (CJEU)
**Question**: In your Android case opinion, what specific evidence supported the finding that Google’s tying practices reduced consumer choice, and how applicable is it to the UK mobile market?
**Why Ask**: Kokott’s recommendation to uphold the €4.1 billion Android fine (Reuters, June 19, 2025) provides a legal precedent for our mobile search claims, particularly on tying and consumer harm.
**Possible Answers**:
– **Favorable**: “We found Google’s MADAs prevented 80% of Android users from accessing rival search engines, with similar effects likely in the UK due to market parallels.”
– **Impact**: Strengthens our Nikki Stopford claim with EU evidence of consumer harm and barriers to entry.
– **Neutral**: “Our findings focused on EU markets, but UK data would need separate analysis.”
– **Impact**: Prompts us to seek UK-specific consumer data from Ofcom or CMA.
– **Unfavorable**: “The opinion did not address UK-specific impacts.”
– **Impact**: Still allows use of EU precedent to argue legal principles in CAT.
### 7. To a Representative from Skyscanner or Checkatrade
**Question**: Can you provide specific examples of how Google’s search ranking practices have favored its own services over yours, and what financial impacts have resulted?
**Why Ask**: Submissions to the CMA from Skyscanner and Checkatrade about Google favoring its own services (Reuters, June 25, 2025) align with our mobile search and ad tech claims, offering evidence of market distortion.
**Possible Answers**:
– **Favorable**: “Google’s ranking algorithms reduced our click-through rates by 30%, costing £10 million annually in lost revenue.”
– **Impact**: Supports self-preferencing claims in both ad tech and mobile search, enhancing CAT evidence.
– **Neutral**: “We’ve noticed ranking biases but lack precise financial data.”
– **Impact**: Encourages further discovery to quantify harm.
– **Unfavorable**: “Our losses are due to other market factors, not Google.”
– **Impact**: Challenges us to focus on specific self-preferencing evidence from other sources.
### 8. To a Representative from the UK Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT)
**Question**: How would the DSIT assess the feasibility of COCOO’s proposed Dynamic Ad Tech Market Integrity Monitoring System (DATMIS) to address Google’s ad tech dominance?
**Why Ask**: Our unsolicited proposal for DATMIS (from chat history) aims to secure a public contract to monitor ad tech markets, aligning with CMA’s transparency goals (Digiday, June 26, 2025). DSIT’s input could validate its viability.
**Possible Answers**:
– **Favorable**: “DATMIS aligns with our digital market goals and could be piloted with £500,000 initial funding.”
– **Impact**: Supports our contract proposal, enhancing mediation leverage.
– **Neutral**: “We’re interested but need a detailed cost-benefit analysis.”
– **Impact**: Prompts refinement of the proposal to secure DSIT support.
– **Unfavorable**: “Our priorities are elsewhere; CMA handles digital regulation.”
– **Impact**: Shifts focus to CMA for contract advocacy.
### 9. To a Representative from the News Media Association (for Mediation)
**Question**: In a mediation process, what specific remedies would UK publishers prioritize to address Google’s use of their content in AI Overviews and ad tech practices?
**Why Ask**: The NMA’s concerns about AI Overviews (The Register, June 24, 2025) align with our ad tech claims, and their input could shape a mediation agreement to resolve publisher harms.
**Possible Answers**:
– **Favorable**: “Publishers want revenue-sharing for AI Overviews and fair auction terms, with damages of £1 billion for past losses.”
– **Impact**: Strengthens mediation terms and supports CAT damages claim.
– **Neutral**: “We seek transparency and control but haven’t quantified damages.”
– **Impact**: Guides mediation toward transparency-focused remedies.
– **Unfavorable**: “We prefer regulatory solutions over mediation.”
– **Impact**: Encourages us to align mediation with CMA interventions.
### 10. To a Litigation Funder (e.g., Fortress Investment Group)
**Question**: What data or evidence would you require to fund or purchase our collective action claims against Google for ad tech and mobile search harms?
**Why Ask**: The chat history highlights litigation finance as a strategy (e.g., Fortress Investment Group). Funders’ requirements can refine our evidence dossier to secure funding, enhancing our case’s financial viability.
**Possible Answers**:
– **Favorable**: “We need detailed publisher revenue loss data and consumer usage stats, with a minimum £500 million claim value.”
– **Impact**: Guides evidence collection to meet funding criteria, strengthening CAT case.
– **Neutral**: “We’re interested but need a legal opinion on CAT success likelihood.”
– **Impact**: Prompts us to secure expert analysis for funders.
– **Unfavorable**: “The claim’s risk profile is too high without stronger evidence.”
– **Impact**: Focuses efforts on gathering robust data from CMA or NMA.
—
### Conclusion
These questions target key stakeholders—industry leaders, regulators, Google representatives, legal experts, and potential funders—to elicit evidence and support for our CAT case, public contract proposals, and mediation efforts. Favorable answers could provide statistical data, legal precedents, regulatory validation, and funding commitments, significantly boosting our chances of success. Neutral or unfavorable answers guide further discovery or strategic adjustments, ensuring we remain agile in building our case. Let me know how to proceed with implementing these questions or refining our approach!
NEWS & CASE UPDATES
1. UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) Proposes Interventions on Google’s Search Business
**Source**: AP News, June 24, 2025 [](https://apnews.com/article/google-regulators-search-engines-uk-britain-88b82623dbaceb10708c95b9130edf01)
**Details**: The CMA has proposed applying the UK’s Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act to Google’s search business, suggesting measures like choice screens for British users to select rival search services and rules for fair search rankings. The CMA highlighted Google’s market power, noting it may need to give publishers more control over content usage, including in AI-generated outputs. However, political shifts favoring Big Tech investment have weakened the CMA’s enforcement stance, delaying a third strategic market status investigation to 2026.
**Relevance to Our Case**:
– **Mobile Search (Consumers)**: The CMA’s push for choice screens directly supports our claim of consumer harm due to Google’s default search agreements (MADAs and Apple deals). It validates the finding that these practices limit consumer choice and innovation, as choice screens aim to mitigate barriers to entry for rival search engines.
– **Ad Tech (Publishers)**: The proposal for publishers to have more control over content usage in AI outputs aligns with our argument that Google’s self-preferencing (e.g., favoring AdX) harms publishers’ revenue streams. This regulatory focus strengthens our case for gross price and umbrella effects.
**Incorporation Strategy**:
– Cite the CMA’s proposals in our CAT filings to argue that regulators acknowledge Google’s anti-competitive practices, reinforcing the legal basis for our claims under Chapter II of the Competition Act 1998.
– Use the CMA’s recognition of publisher control issues to bolster evidence of overhang damages, emphasizing persistent harm from Google’s practices.
– Highlight the political delay to argue that private collective action (our case) is critical due to regulatory hesitance, enhancing the urgency of our claims.
—
### 2. EU Court Adviser Backs €4.1 Billion Android Antitrust Fine
**Source**: Reuters, AP News, CNBC, Fortune, Euractiv, TechJuice, June 19-20, 2025 [](https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/boards-policy-regulation/eu-court-adviser-sides-with-regulators-googles-fight-against-eu-antitrust-fine-2025-06-19/)[](https://apnews.com/article/google-android-european-union-antitrust-32cefb67817bce21341cbc81dd13e012)[](https://www.cnbc.com/2025/06/19/google-looks-likely-to-lose-appeal-against-record-4point7-billion-eu-fine.html)
**Details**: Advocate General Juliane Kokott at the European Court of Justice (CJEU) recommended dismissing Google’s appeal against a €4.1 billion fine for anti-competitive practices in its Android ecosystem (Case C-738/22 P). The 2018 European Commission ruling found Google abused its dominance by tying its search engine and Chrome browser to Android, restricting competition via MADAs. The fine, slightly reduced in 2022, is likely to be upheld, as CJEU judges follow advocate general opinions in 80% of cases. A final ruling is expected later in 2025. Google argued it should be compared to a hypothetical as-efficient competitor, which Kokott rejected as unrealistic.
**Relevance to Our Case**:
– **Mobile Search (Consumers)**: This directly supports our Nikki Stopford v. Google case (1606/7/7/23), which alleges consumer harm from Google’s Android tying practices. The CJEU’s backing of the EU’s findings strengthens our argument that MADAs create barriers to entry and reduce consumer choice and innovation.
– **Ad Tech (Publishers)**: While primarily mobile-focused, the Android case’s precedent on self-preferencing (established in Google Shopping, AT.39740) reinforces our ad tech claims, as similar legal principles apply to Google’s DFP-AdX favoritism.
**Incorporation Strategy**:
– Reference the CJEU advocate general’s opinion in CAT filings to establish a strong EU precedent for tying and exclusivity practices, enhancing the legal foundation for our Chapter II and Article 102 TFEU claims.
– Use Kokott’s rejection of Google’s competitor argument to counter potential defenses in our case, showing that Google’s dominance cannot be justified by hypothetical competition.
– Highlight the EU’s €8.25 billion in fines against Google over the past decade to underscore a pattern of anti-competitive behavior, bolstering our narrative of systemic market harm.
—
### 3. US DOJ Antitrust Case on Google’s Ad Tech Practices
**Source**: Reuters, May 2, 2025 [](https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/boards-policy-regulation/google-will-seek-avoid-ad-tech-spinoff-antitrust-case-2025-05-02/)
**Details**: US District Judge Leonie Brinkema ruled in April 2025 that Google unlawfully tied its ad exchange (AdX) to its ad server (DFP), harming competition and publishers. A trial on remedies, including potential divestiture of ad tech components, is set for September 2025. The DOJ’s case mirrors our claims, focusing on Google’s self-preferencing and anti-competitive policies that reduce publisher revenues and internet user benefits.
**Relevance to Our Case**:
– **Ad Tech (Publishers)**: The US ruling directly supports our Ad Tech Collective Action LLP v. Alphabet Inc. (1572/7/7/22) by validating claims of self-preferencing (DFP-AdX tying) and publisher harm (gross price and take rate effects). The remedy phase strengthens our argument for significant damages due to umbrella effects and overhang damages.
– **Mobile Search (Consumers)**: The ad tech case indirectly supports our consumer claims by highlighting Google’s broader anti-competitive strategy, which includes leveraging search dominance to control related markets.
**Incorporation Strategy**:
– Cite the US DOJ ruling in CAT submissions to reinforce the global consensus on Google’s ad tech abuses, strengthening our Chapter II claims.
– Use the remedy phase (potential divestiture) to argue for substantial damages in our case, as Google’s practices have caused long-term market distortions.
– Leverage the DOJ’s evidence of publisher harm to substantiate our claims of revenue losses and higher commissions, enhancing the case’s economic impact.
—
### 4. UK CAT Certifies £1.04 Billion Claim Against Google Play Store
**Source**: Irish Legal News, June 12, 2025 [](https://irishlegal.com/articles/uk-court-rules-ps104bn-legal-action-against-google-can-proceed-to-trial)
**Details**: The CAT certified a £1 billion claim against Google on behalf of UK app developers for overcharges in the Play Store, allowing it to proceed to trial. The case alleges anti-competitive conduct similar to our mobile search claims, with global scrutiny from the EU, UK CMA, and US courts reinforcing the pattern of Google’s market abuses.
**Relevance to Our Case**:
– **Mobile Search (Consumers)**: The Play Store case parallels our Nikki Stopford claim, as both involve Google’s Android ecosystem and anti-competitive tying practices (MADAs). The CAT’s certification signals a favorable environment for collective actions against Google.
– **Ad Tech (Publishers)**: The broader pattern of Google’s anti-competitive conduct strengthens our narrative of systemic market dominance across digital sectors.
**Incorporation Strategy**:
– Reference the Play Store certification in CAT filings to demonstrate the tribunal’s willingness to advance collective actions against Google, boosting our case’s likelihood of success.
– Use the global scrutiny cited in the article to argue that Google’s practices are consistently anti-competitive, supporting our claims of consumer harm and market barriers.
– Highlight the £1 billion claim’s scale to justify the significant damages sought in our case, emphasizing the economic impact on affected parties.
—
### 5. Google’s Proposed Search Result Tweaks in EU
**Source**: Reuters, June 20, 2025 [](https://www.reuters.com/legal/litigation/google-offers-tweak-search-results-promote-rivals-stave-off-eu-antitrust-fine-2025-06-20/)
**Details**: Google has proposed changes to its search results to better showcase rivals, aiming to avoid a hefty EU antitrust fine in its ongoing ad tech investigation (AT.40670). This follows global regulatory pressure on Google’s digital ad business.
**Relevance to Our Case**:
– **Ad Tech (Publishers)**: Google’s willingness to adjust search results to promote rivals suggests an acknowledgment of anti-competitive concerns, supporting our claims of self-preferencing in ad tech (e.g., DFP-AdX favoritism).
– **Mobile Search (Consumers)**: The focus on search result fairness ties to our claims about default search agreements limiting consumer choice, as similar principles apply to mobile search visibility.
**Incorporation Strategy**:
– Cite Google’s proposed concessions in CAT filings to argue that the company implicitly admits to anti-competitive practices, strengthening our case for liability under Chapter II and Article 102 TFEU.
– Use the EU’s ongoing ad tech investigation to emphasize the global scope of Google’s market abuses, reinforcing our claims of publisher and consumer harm.
– Argue that Google’s proactive changes indicate the feasibility of remedies, supporting our case for damages to address overhang effects.
—
### 6. Political Challenges to UK Antitrust Enforcement
**Source**: Reuters, June 25, 2025 [](https://www.reuters.com/legal/litigation/uk-politics-blunts-antitrust-action-against-google-2025-06-25/)[](https://www.investing.com/news/economy-news/analysisuk-politics-blunts-antitrust-action-against-google-4110810)
**Details**: The CMA’s plan to regulate Google’s search business faces political resistance due to Big Tech’s economic influence in the UK. Lawyer Ronan Scanlan, a former CMA deputy director, noted that the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act grants broad powers, but political capital limits aggressive interventions. The CMA delayed a third strategic market status investigation to 2026.
**Relevance to Our Case**:
– **Mobile Search (Consumers)**: The political hesitance underscores the importance of our private collective action, as regulatory delays may prevent timely consumer remedies.
– **Ad Tech (Publishers)**: The CMA’s limited enforcement capacity highlights the necessity of our lawsuit to address publisher harms, such as gross price and take rate effects.
**Incorporation Strategy**:
– Emphasize in CAT filings that private litigation is critical due to political constraints on the CMA, positioning our case as a necessary complement to regulatory efforts.
– Use Scanlan’s statement to argue that the CMA’s broad powers are underutilized, justifying our pursuit of damages for publisher and consumer harms.
– Highlight the delay to 2026 to underscore the urgency of our collective action to address ongoing market distortions.
—
### 7. US Search Antitrust Case Developments
**Source**: Reuters, May 30, 2025; Ars Technica, May 9, 2025; The New York Times, May 1, 2025 [](https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/boards-policy-regulation/google-says-it-will-appeal-online-search-antitrust-decision-2025-05-31/)[](https://arstechnica.com/google/2025/05/googles-search-antitrust-trial-is-wrapping-up-heres-what-we-learned/)[](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/01/technology/google-antitrust-trial-ai.html)
**Details**: In the US, Judge Amit Mehta ruled in 2024 that Google violated antitrust law by maintaining a search monopoly. The remedy phase, concluded in May 2025, saw the DOJ propose a 10-year oversight regime, while Google argued that AI competition (e.g., OpenAI) negates the need for intervention. Google claimed it no longer uses exclusive agreements with carriers like Samsung. A decision on remedies is expected in August 2025, with Google planning to appeal.
**Relevance to Our Case**:
– **Mobile Search (Consumers)**: Google’s claim of ending exclusive agreements supports our argument that past MADAs and Apple deals harmed consumers by limiting choice, as the company’s shift suggests prior anti-competitive behavior. The DOJ’s focus on search monopoly reinforces our claims of barriers to entry and reduced innovation.
– **Ad Tech (Publishers)**: The broader antitrust scrutiny strengthens our narrative of Google’s systemic market dominance, indirectly supporting our ad tech claims.
**Incorporation Strategy**:
– Cite Google’s admission of ending exclusive agreements in CAT filings to argue that past practices (MADAs) were anti-competitive, supporting our consumer harm claims.
– Use the DOJ’s remedy proposals to advocate for significant damages in our case, as they reflect the severity of Google’s market abuses.
– Reference the AI competition argument to counter Google’s defenses, noting that AI advancements do not negate past consumer harm.
—
### 8. Mexico Closes Antitrust Case Against Google
**Source**: Reuters, June 14, 2025 [](https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/google-comes-out-top-years-long-mexico-antitrust-case-closed-2025-06-13/)
**Details**: Mexico’s Federal Economic Competition Commission (Cofece) closed a 2020 investigation into Google’s digital advertising services, finding no monopolistic practices. The probe focused on Google’s search and third-party ad platforms, examining undue advantages in ad buying.
**Relevance to Our Case**:
– **Ad Tech (Publishers)**: While Mexico’s ruling is a setback, it contrasts with EU and US findings, allowing us to argue that the UK’s stricter regulatory framework (e.g., CMA, CAT) supports our claims of self-preferencing and publisher harm.
– **Mobile Search (Consumers)**: The case’s focus on search advertising indirectly relates to our mobile search claims, highlighting global variations in enforcement that justify our private action.
**Incorporation Strategy**:
– Use the Mexican ruling to contrast with EU and US findings in CAT filings, emphasizing the UK’s robust competition law environment as favorable to our claims.
– Argue that the lack of findings in Mexico does not negate evidence of harm in the UK, reinforcing our gross price and consumer harm arguments.
– Highlight global scrutiny to underscore the need for our collective action in the absence of consistent regulatory outcomes.
—
### 9. Social Media Sentiment on Google’s Antitrust Issues
**Source**: Posts on X, June 17-25, 2025
**Details**: Posts on X reflect public and industry sentiment on Google’s antitrust issues. Lina Khan, former FTC Chair, linked internet “enshittification” to antitrust problems, including Google’s search practices. The CMA’s proposed interventions (e.g., choice screens, fair rankings) were noted, with one post highlighting a chart showing Google’s search dominance as a barrier to AI competition. Another post speculated on Google’s valuation and antitrust risks.
**Relevance to Our Case**:
– **Mobile Search (Consumers)**: Public sentiment on X about degraded search quality and lack of choice supports our claims of consumer harm due to Google’s default search agreements. The CMA chart strengthens our argument on barriers to entry in mobile search.
– **Ad Tech (Publishers)**: The focus on Google’s market power in search indirectly supports our ad tech claims, as search dominance fuels ad tech control.
**Incorporation Strategy**:
– Reference public sentiment on X in CAT filings to demonstrate widespread recognition of Google’s anti-competitive impact, supporting consumer harm claims.
– Use the CMA chart to argue that Google’s search monopoly stifles competition, reinforcing our mobile search and ad tech claims.
– Note the speculative valuation concerns to highlight market risks from Google’s practices, supporting our case for substantial damages.
—
### Incorporation Strategies to Increase Success Chances
1. **Strengthen Legal Arguments**:
– Leverage EU (CJEU Android case) and US (DOJ ad tech ruling) precedents to establish a global pattern of Google’s anti-competitive behavior, reinforcing our Chapter II and Article 102 TFEU claims.
– Cite the CAT’s Play Store certification to argue that the tribunal is receptive to collective actions, increasing our likelihood of success.
– Use Google’s proposed EU search tweaks and admission of ending exclusive agreements to argue implicit acknowledgment of past anti-competitive practices.
2. **Enhance Evidentiary Base**:
– Incorporate CMA proposals (choice screens, publisher control) to substantiate consumer and publisher harms, linking to gross price, take rate, and reduced choice effects.
– Use DOJ and EU findings on self-preferencing and tying to provide detailed evidence of market distortions, supporting our claims of umbrella effects and barriers to entry.
– Reference Statista or Ofcom data (if accessed) to quantify Google’s market share in ad tech (>90% in search advertising) and mobile search, reinforcing dominance arguments.
3. **Address Defenses**:
– Counter Google’s claim of AI-driven competition (e.g., OpenAI) by noting that past harms (pre-2025) remain unaddressed, as supported by the DOJ case and EU rulings.
– Use the CJEU advocate general’s rejection of Google’s “as-efficient competitor” defense to preempt similar arguments in our case.
– Highlight the Mexican case’s limited scope to argue that UK-specific evidence (e.g., CMA findings) is more relevant to our claims.
4. **Emphasize Urgency and Private Action**:
– Cite political delays in CMA enforcement (2026 investigation) to argue that our private collective action is critical to address ongoing harms promptly.
– Use public sentiment on X to show market and consumer demand for accountability, strengthening the public interest in our case.
– Argue that the CAT’s role in delivering justice is vital given regulatory constraints, as noted by Scanlan, to secure damages for publishers and consumers.
—
### Conclusion
These updates—spanning CMA proposals, EU and US antitrust rulings, the CAT’s Play Store certification, Google’s concessions, and public sentiment—provide a robust foundation to strengthen our case. By incorporating these findings into our CAT filings, we can enhance our legal arguments, evidentiary base, and counter-strategies, increasing our chances of success in proving Google’s anti-competitive practices and securing damages for publishers and consumers. Let me know if you need further analysis or specific actions to implement these findings[](https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/boards-policy-regulation/eu-court-adviser-sides-with-regulators-googles-fight-against-eu-antitrust-fine-2025-06-19/)[](https://apnews.com/article/google-android-european-union-antitrust-32cefb67817bce21341cbc81dd13e012)