EVIDENCIA GROK

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GSC    MEDIA CAMPAIGN MODEL    LINKACTION

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MY SEARCHLINKS

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Search Link: [https://www.opensanctions.org/advancedsearch/](https://www.opensanctions.org/advancedsearch/)

This is an advanced search interface for OpenSanctions, a database of sanctions lists and persons of interest, with filters for entity type, country, and sanctions list.

– **Cause of Action: Abuse of Dominant Position (Ad Tech – Publishers)**
– **Search 1:** Enter “Google” or “Alphabet Inc.” in the search field, select “Company” as the entity type, and filter by “Sanctions” topic to check if Google’s ad tech subsidiaries or partners are sanctioned, potentially supporting claims of unfair market advantages.
– **Search 2:** Use “digital advertising” as the keyword, apply “High-risk jurisdictions” filter (e.g., Russia, Iran), and look for sanctioned entities in the ad tech supply chain that might connect to Google’s operations.
– **Search 3:** Search “ad tech monopoly” with “United States” or “European Union” filters to identify sanctions on competitors or partners that could indicate market distortion.

– **Cause of Action: Abuse of Dominant Position (Mobile Search – Consumers)**
– **Search 1:** Input “Google” with “Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs)” filter and “United States” country to find executives or affiliates with political ties that might influence mobile search dominance.
– **Search 2:** Search “mobile technology sanctions” with “Company” entity type to uncover sanctions affecting mobile search infrastructure or Android ecosystem partners.
– **Search 3:** Use “Android” with “Sanctions” topic filter to see if any Android-related entities are restricted, potentially impacting consumer market competition.

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### Search Link: [https://www.opensanctions.org/docs/api/](https://www.opensanctions.org/docs/api/)
This page documents the OpenSanctions API, offering programmatic access to sanctions data via endpoints like `/search` and `/entities`.

– **Cause of Action: Abuse of Dominant Position (Ad Tech – Publishers)**
– **Search 1:** Query the `/search` endpoint with “Google ad tech” to retrieve sanctioned entities linked to Google’s ad tech operations, automating checks across datasets.
– **Search 2:** Use `/entities` to fetch bulk data, then filter for “digital advertising” in descriptions to analyze sanctioned companies in the ad tech sector.
– **Search 3:** Run “ad tech sanctions” on `/search` with a focus on EU or US jurisdictions to identify regulatory actions affecting ad tech competition.

– **Cause of Action: Abuse of Dominant Position (Mobile Search – Consumers)**
– **Search 1:** Query `/search` with “Google mobile” to find sanctioned entities tied to mobile search or Android operations.
– **Search 2:** Use `/entities` to download data and filter for “mobile technology” to cross-check with consumer market players impacted by sanctions.
– **Search 3:** Search “Android sanctions” via `/search` to detect restrictions on mobile ecosystem partners that could limit consumer options.

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### Search Link: [https://www.opensanctions.org/docs/bulk/](https://www.opensanctions.org/docs/bulk/)
This page explains how to download bulk sanctions datasets for offline analysis, offering comprehensive access to entity records.

– **Cause of Action: Abuse of Dominant Position (Ad Tech – Publishers)**
– **Search 1:** Download the dataset and filter for “digital advertising” in entity descriptions to identify sanctioned ad tech firms, then cross-reference with Google’s known partners.
– **Search 2:** Search bulk data for “Google” or “Alphabet” to find direct or indirect sanction hits in ad tech operations.
– **Search 3:** Analyze “ad tech” keyword hits alongside geographic data (e.g., EU, US) to spot sanction patterns affecting market dynamics.

– **Cause of Action: Abuse of Dominant Position (Mobile Search – Consumers)**
– **Search 1:** Download and filter for “mobile technology” to identify sanctioned entities in the mobile search ecosystem, like hardware or app providers.
– **Search 2:** Search “Google” or “Android” in the bulk data to uncover sanction connections impacting mobile consumer services.
– **Search 3:** Look for “search engine” mentions to find sanctioned competitors or partners that could influence consumer access.

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### Search Link: [https://www.opensanctions.org/faq/150/downloading](https://www.opensanctions.org/faq/150/downloading)
This FAQ page likely provides guidance on downloading OpenSanctions data, including compliance and usage details.

– **Cause of Action: Abuse of Dominant Position (Ad Tech – Publishers)**
– **Search 1:** Review the page for data download limits or terms to ensure ad tech-related bulk searches (e.g., “digital advertising sanctions”) are compliant.
– **Search 2:** Check for instructions on accessing commercial-use data to validate evidence of sanctioned ad tech entities.

– **Cause of Action: Abuse of Dominant Position (Mobile Search – Consumers)**
– **Search 1:** Confirm download processes to support mobile search sanction searches (e.g., “Android sanctions”) within legal bounds.
– **Search 2:** Look for consumer data usage guidelines to ensure mobile market analysis adheres to terms.

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### Search Link: [https://globaltradealert.org/data-center](https://globaltradealert.org/data-center)
This page offers trade policy data with searchable measures, filters for country, sector, and intervention type.

– **Cause of Action: Abuse of Dominant Position (Ad Tech – Publishers)**
– **Search 1:** Search “digital advertising trade barriers” with “United States” and “European Union” filters to find policies impacting ad tech competition.
– **Search 2:** Use “Google trade policy” with “Services” sector to explore trade measures affecting Google’s ad tech dominance.
– **Search 3:** Search “ad tech market access” to identify trade interventions limiting publisher options.

– **Cause of Action: Abuse of Dominant Position (Mobile Search – Consumers)**
– **Search 1:** Input “mobile technology trade measures” with “Consumer goods” filter to find policies restricting mobile search competition.
– **Search 2:** Search “Google mobile trade” with “United States” to uncover trade impacts on consumer access.
– **Search 3:** Use “search engine trade barriers” to detect policies affecting consumer-facing search markets.

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### Search Link: [https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/industries](https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/industries)
This page lists Mayer Brown’s industry expertise, possibly with a search function or industry sections.

– **Cause of Action: Abuse of Dominant Position (Ad Tech – Publishers)**
– **Search 1:** Search “digital media” or “advertising technology” for legal insights or case studies on ad tech dominance.
– **Search 2:** Explore “Technology” industry section for publications on ad tech market control.
– **Search 3:** Look for “media regulation” content to find regulatory perspectives on publisher impacts.

– **Cause of Action: Abuse of Dominant Position (Mobile Search – Consumers)**
– **Search 1:** Search “telecommunications” for legal takes on mobile search market issues.
– **Search 2:** Check “Consumer Technology” section for consumer rights discussions tied to mobile dominance.
– **Search 3:** Use “mobile market” to find relevant expertise on consumer impacts.

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### Search Link: [https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/](https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/)
This is the UK Companies House search page for company records, financials, and directors.

– **Cause of Action: Abuse of Dominant Position (Ad Tech – Publishers)**
– **Search 1:** Search “Google UK Limited” for financials showing ad tech revenue dominance.
– **Search 2:** Look up “DoubleClick” (Google subsidiary) for acquisition details affecting publishers.
– **Search 3:** Search related entities (e.g., “YouTube Limited”) for ad tech market overlap.

– **Cause of Action: Abuse of Dominant Position (Mobile Search – Consumers)**
– **Search 1:** Use “Google UK Limited” to find mobile search revenue or consumer service filings.
– **Search 2:** Search “Android UK” (if listed) for mobile ecosystem financials.
– **Search 3:** Check director overlaps with consumer tech firms for influence evidence.

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### Search Link: [https://www.sede.registradores.org/](https://www.sede.registradores.org/)
This Spanish registry provides company and property data, likely requiring Spanish queries.

– **Cause of Action: Abuse of Dominant Position (Ad Tech – Publishers)**
– **Search 1:** Search “Google Spain S.L.” for financials tied to ad tech operations.
– **Search 2:** Look for “centros de datos publicidad” (ad tech data centers) in property records.
– **Search 3:** Search “Alphabet España” for broader ad tech entity details.

– **Cause of Action: Abuse of Dominant Position (Mobile Search – Consumers)**
– **Search 1:** Use “Google Spain S.L.” for mobile search financials or consumer agreements.
– **Search 2:** Search “tecnología móvil” (mobile tech) for related company filings.
– **Search 3:** Check “Android España” (if applicable) for consumer market scope.

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### Search Link: [https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/legacy/companysearch.html](https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/legacy/companysearch.html)
This SEC EDGAR page searches US company filings like 10-Ks and 10-Qs.

– **Cause of Action: Abuse of Dominant Position (Ad Tech – Publishers)**
– **Search 1:** Search “Alphabet Inc.” for 10-K “Legal Proceedings” on ad tech probes.
– **Search 2:** Use “ad tech acquisitions” for filings on market consolidation (e.g., DoubleClick).
– **Search 3:** Search “digital advertising revenue” for dominance metrics.

– **Cause of Action: Abuse of Dominant Position (Mobile Search – Consumers)**
– **Search 1:** Look up “Alphabet Inc.” for “mobile search agreements” in disclosures.
– **Search 2:** Search “Android antitrust” for regulatory action evidence.
– **Search 3:** Use “consumer privacy mobile” for consumer harm indicators.

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### Search Link: [https://www.globalspec.com/search/products?categoryIds=5346](https://www.globalspec.com/search/products?categoryIds=5346)
This product search page (category 5346) likely relates to technical products, with a basic search interface.

– **Cause of Action: Abuse of Dominant Position (Ad Tech – Publishers)**
– **Search 1:** Search “Google ad tech hardware” for infrastructure supporting dominance.
– **Search 2:** Use “advertising servers” to find suppliers tied to Google’s ad tech.
– **Search 3:** Search “digital ad components” for technical market control evidence.

– **Cause of Action: Abuse of Dominant Position (Mobile Search – Consumers)**
– **Search 1:** Input “mobile search technology” for consumer device components.
– **Search 2:** Search “Google mobile hardware” for Android ecosystem tech.
– **Search 3:** Use “consumer mobile products” for market influence insights.

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This response covers all search links with tailored, granular searches for each cause of action. The strategies leverage each site’s functionality to gather evidence supporting our case. Let me know if you need further refinements!

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Searchlink: https://www.publicsector.co.uk/

This website focuses on UK public sector news, events, and procurement. It has a basic search bar but no explicit advanced search rules visible on the homepage.
**Cause of Action: Abuse of Dominant Position (Ad Tech – Publishers)**
To find evidence of Google’s dominance in ad tech contracts within the public sector, I’d use the search bar with “Google ad tech public sector contracts” and check the “Contracts” or “Procurement” sections for tenders involving Google. Alternatively, “digital advertising suppliers UK government Google” could reveal preferred vendor status.
**Cause of Action: Abuse of Dominant Position (Mobile Search – Consumers)**
To uncover public sector reliance on Google’s mobile search or related consumer impact, I’d search “Google mobile search public sector use” and explore the “News” section for articles on digital service dependencies, or try “mobile search consumer impact UK government” for broader insights.

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### Searchlink: https://www.gov.uk/search/advanced
This is the UK government’s advanced search page, offering filters like policy area, document type, and date range. Rules encourage specific keywords and filters for precision.
**Cause of Action: Abuse of Dominant Position (Ad Tech – Publishers)**
To locate reports on Google’s ad tech practices, I’d search “Google digital advertising investigation” with filters for “Business and industry” policy area, “Reports” document type, and the last 5 years. Another search, “Competition and Markets Authority ad tech Google,” could pull CMA findings.
**Cause of Action: Abuse of Dominant Position (Mobile Search – Consumers)**
For mobile search dominance, I’d try “Google mobile search default agreements” with “Consumer rights” policy area and “Consultations” document type, focusing on regulatory actions. Alternatively, “mobile search competition CMA” with the CMA organisation filter could yield investigation details.

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### Searchlink: https://e-justice.europa.eu/advancedSearchManagement?action=advancedSearch
This EU e-Justice Portal advanced search page covers case law and legislation, with filters for jurisdiction and topic. Rules suggest selecting specific categories for targeted results. I can’t fully access the database to test searches, but I’ll propose based on its structure.
**Cause of Action: Abuse of Dominant Position (Ad Tech – Publishers)**
To find ad tech-related cases, I’d search “Google digital advertising abuse dominance” with “Case law” selected, filtered by “Competition law” and EU jurisdiction. Another option, “ad tech antitrust Google,” could surface relevant rulings.
**Cause of Action: Abuse of Dominant Position (Mobile Search – Consumers)**
For mobile search issues, I’d use “Google mobile search anti-competitive” with “Legislation” and “Competition law” filters, or “default search agreements EU case law” to find precedents on consumer-facing practices.

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### Searchlink: https://e-justice.europa.eu/topics/registers-business-insolvency-land/business-registers-search-company-eu_en
This page links to EU business registers for company data, with a country-by-country search interface. No advanced search rules are detailed, but it’s a directory-style tool.
**Cause of Action: Abuse of Dominant Position (Ad Tech – Publishers)**
To investigate Google’s ad tech operations, I’d search “Google Ireland Limited” in Ireland’s register for financials or ownership tied to ad tech revenue, or “Google UK Limited” in the UK register for local market control evidence.
**Cause of Action: Abuse of Dominant Position (Mobile Search – Consumers)**
For mobile search, I’d use the same searches—”Google Ireland Limited” or “Google UK Limited”—to find subsidiary roles in mobile service agreements or consumer market influence, focusing on operational scope.

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### Searchlink: https://competition-cases.ec.europa.eu/searchCaseInstruments
This EU competition case search tool includes filters for case type, status, and sector. Rules emphasize precise terms and filter use. I can’t execute searches, but the structure is clear.
**Cause of Action: Abuse of Dominant Position (Ad Tech – Publishers)**
To find ad tech cases, I’d search “Google ad tech antitrust” with “Antitrust” case type, “Information and communication” sector, and “Closed” or “Ongoing” status. “Digital advertising dominance” could broaden the scope.
**Cause of Action: Abuse of Dominant Position (Mobile Search – Consumers)**
For mobile search, I’d try “Google Android mobile search” with “Antitrust” and “Mobile platforms” filters, or “default search Google iOS” to uncover consumer-related case documents.

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### Searchlink: https://db-comp.eu/
This site seems to be an EU competition law resource, but I can’t access it to confirm content or search rules—it may be a placeholder or restricted. I’ll assume it offers case law and commentary.
**Cause of Action: Abuse of Dominant Position (Ad Tech – Publishers)**
Assuming a search function, I’d use “Google ad tech dominance” to find analyses, or “digital advertising competition law” for broader context on publisher impacts.
**Cause of Action: Abuse of Dominant Position (Mobile Search – Consumers)**
I’d search “Google mobile search abuse” for legal insights, or “default search consumer harm” to explore commentary on consumer effects, adapting based on available sections.

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### Searchlink: https://policy celestial.trade.ec.europa.eu/
This EU trade policy page (assuming “policy.trade.ec.europa.eu” from context) covers trade agreements and digital policy, with a search bar but no advanced rules listed.
**Cause of Action: Abuse of Dominant Position (Ad Tech – Publishers)**
To find digital market policy impacts, I’d search “Google digital services tax” for ad tech taxation discussions, or “trade policy digital advertising” for market access angles.
**Cause of Action: Abuse of Dominant Position (Mobile Search – Consumers)**
I’d use “Google mobile search trade barriers” to explore consumer market effects, or “digital trade consumer rights” for policy perspectives on search dominance.

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### Searchlink: https://trade.ec.europa.eu/access-to-markets/en/home
This market access page includes a search function and focuses on trade barriers. No specific advanced search rules are noted.
**Cause of Action: Abuse of Dominant Position (Ad Tech – Publishers)**
To uncover ad tech market issues, I’d search “Google digital advertising market access” for barriers or dominance evidence, or “ad tech trade EU” for broader data.
**Cause of Action: Abuse of Dominant Position (Mobile Search – Consumers)**
I’d try “Google mobile search market barriers” for consumer market insights, or “digital services consumer access” to link dominance to trade effects.

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### Searchlink: https://www.investegate.co.uk/advanced-search
This financial site’s advanced search offers company and announcement filters, with rules suggesting specific terms and date ranges.
**Cause of Action: Abuse of Dominant Position (Ad Tech – Publishers)**
To find ad tech moves, I’d search “Alphabet Inc. ad tech acquisition” with “Mergers & Acquisitions” type and recent dates, or “Google regulatory ad tech” for investigation news.
**Cause of Action: Abuse of Dominant Position (Mobile Search – Consumers)**
I’d use “Google mobile search agreements” with “Regulatory News” filter, or “Alphabet consumer mobile search” to find consumer-related disclosures.

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### Searchlink: https://opencorporates.com/companies
This company database allows searches by name or jurisdiction, with no complex rules beyond exact matching.
**Cause of Action: Abuse of Dominant Position (Ad Tech – Publishers)**
To map ad tech operations, I’d search “Google Ireland Limited” for ad tech subsidiary details, or “Alphabet Inc.” for global structure tied to market control.
**Cause of Action: Abuse of Dominant Position (Mobile Search – Consumers)**
I’d use “Google UK Limited” to explore mobile search operations, or “Google LLC” for parent-level consumer market influence data.

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### Searchlink: https://opencorporates.com/registers
This register list links to jurisdiction-specific data, with a simple search interface and no advanced rules.
**Cause of Action: Abuse of Dominant Position (Ad Tech – Publishers)**
I’d search “Google” in Irish or UK registers for ad tech subsidiary filings, focusing on financials or ownership patterns.
**Cause of Action: Abuse of Dominant Position (Mobile Search – Consumers)**
I’d try “Alphabet” in the same registers for mobile search-related entity details, seeking operational or consumer market evidence.

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That’s the full, granular response for all searchlinks. I couldn’t access some sites fully (e.g., e-Justice, db that-comp.eu) to test searches, but I’ve proposed strategies based on their described functions. Let me know how to proceed!

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New Insights

The text outlines a structured compensation campaign targeting Google’s alleged anti-competitive practices in two distinct areas: ad tech services affecting publishers and mobile search impacting UK consumers. This “Public Compensation Project: Google” is driven by COCOO.uk, a non-profit aiming to unite affected parties—publishers and consumers—to seek redress through collective actions already certified by the UK Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT). The campaign emphasizes the impracticality of individual claims against Google due to high costs and complexity, positioning collective action as the only viable path to justice. It also highlights a broader goal of enhancing transparency and competition in digital markets, suggesting that participation could influence regulatory reform. A notable strategic angle is the use of litigation finance options, such as selling claims to firms like Fortress Investment Group, to fund and de-risk the effort, alongside leveraging international transparency standards to scrutinize Google’s corporate structure.

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### Findings of Infringement (Allowing a Follow-On Claim)
The text identifies specific anti-competitive behaviors by Google that support follow-on claims, where damages are sought based on established infringements:

– **Ad Tech Case (Publishers):**
– Google manipulated its ad tech stack—favoring its own services like DoubleClick for Publishers (DFP), AdX, Google Ads, and Display & Video 360 (DV360)—to the detriment of competing services.
– This self-preferencing allegedly reduced competition in ad auctions, leading to lower revenues for publishers (gross price effect) and higher commissions from supply-side platforms (take rate effect), with additional losses in direct sales and other networks (umbrella effects) and persistent harm (overhang damages).

– **Mobile Search Case (Consumers):**
– Google abused its dominant position in the mobile search market by securing default status on Android and iOS devices through agreements like Mobile Application Distribution Agreements (MADAs) with Android manufacturers and revenue-sharing deals with Apple for Safari.
– These practices limited competition, reducing consumer choice, innovation, and search quality by raising barriers to entry for rival search engines.

These findings align with certified collective actions—Ad Tech Collective Action LLP v. Alphabet Inc. and Nikki Stopford v. Google—indicating a legal basis for follow-on claims under UK competition law.

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### Possible Causes of Action
The infringements suggest the following legal claims:

– **Ad Tech Case (Publishers):**
– **Abuse of Dominant Position:** Violation of Chapter II of the UK Competition Act 1998 and/or Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), based on self-preferencing within the ad tech ecosystem (e.g., DFP favoring AdX, AdX favoring DFP, and DSPs favoring AdX), constituting a continuous anti-competitive practice.

– **Mobile Search Case (Consumers):**
– **Abuse of Dominant Position:** Breach of Chapter II of the UK Competition Act 1998 and/or Article 102 TFEU, through exclusionary conduct such as tying Google Search and Chrome to the Play Store on Android and exclusivity agreements with Apple, entrenching Google’s dominance and stifling competition in mobile search.

These causes of action are grounded in competition law and supported by the CAT’s certification of the collective proceedings.

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### List of Evidence and Sources (Including Type of Evidence)
The text provides a range of evidence sources and types to substantiate the claims:

– **Corporate and Financial Intelligence:**
– **Source:** OpenCorporates, Companies House
– **Evidence:** Corporate structure of Google UK Limited, showing Alphabet Inc. as the ultimate controller with over 75% ownership; director lists including key figures like Kenneth Yi.
– **Type:** Documentary evidence (company filings, ownership records).
– **Source:** SEC EDGAR
– **Evidence:** Alphabet Inc.’s subsidiary list (e.g., Google LLC, entities in Delaware and Bermuda), risk disclosures acknowledging legal proceedings.
– **Type:** Financial evidence (SEC filings, risk statements).

– **Legal and Case Law Databases:**
– **Source:** Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT), BAILII
– **Evidence:** Active case statuses for Ad Tech Collective Action LLP (1572/7/7/22) and Nikki Stopford (1606/7/7/23); prior UK cases against Google (e.g., Kelkoo, Epic Games).
– **Type:** Legal evidence (case records, judgments).
– **Source:** European Commission Competition Portal, CURIA
– **Evidence:** EU precedents like Google Android (AT.40099, €4.125 billion fine for tying), Google Shopping (AT.39740, €2.42 billion fine for self-preferencing).
– **Type:** Legal evidence (regulatory decisions, court rulings).

– **Regulatory and Governmental Repositories:**
– **Source:** Violation Tracker UK, CMA/GOV.UK
– **Evidence:** Unpriced UK entries for Google’s anti-competitive practices; CMA’s market study showing Google’s >90% search ad share and consumer harm.
– **Type:** Statistical evidence (market share data), regulatory evidence (violation records).
– **Source:** Violation Tracker US
– **Evidence:** Alphabet Inc.’s $2.7 billion in penalties for consumer protection and privacy violations.
– **Type:** Statistical evidence (penalty totals).

– **International Trade and Sanctions Monitors:**
– **Source:** Global Trade Alert, OpenSanctions
– **Evidence:** Digital Services Taxes targeting Google in the UK and EU; Sundar Pichai as a politically exposed person (PEP) due to US political donations.
– **Type:** Contextual evidence (trade policy data), screening evidence (PEP status).

– **Public Procurement and Tendering Portals:**
– **Source:** Contracts Finder, Find a Tender
– **Evidence:** Google’s involvement in UK public contracts (e.g., Google Meet usage).
– **Type:** Contractual evidence (procurement records).

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### Search Strategies to Implement on Search Platforms to Seek Evidence
Here are tailored strategies to gather evidence from the specified platforms:

– **OpenCorporates and Companies House:**
– Search “Google UK Limited” and “Alphabet Inc.” to retrieve incorporation details, ownership structure, and director histories.
– Cross-reference directors (e.g., Kenneth Yi, Sundar Pichai) for other affiliations using reverse searches.
– Filter by SIC code 82990 to identify competitors in related business support services.

– **SEC EDGAR:**
– Query “Alphabet Inc.” (CIK: 0001652044) for 10-K and 10-Q filings, focusing on “Risk Factors” and “Legal Proceedings” sections.
– Review Exhibit 21 for a full subsidiary list, noting jurisdictions like Delaware and Bermuda.
– Search for acquisition announcements (e.g., DoubleClick, AdMob) to trace consolidation patterns.

– **Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) and BAILII:**
– Search case database for “Google” or “Alphabet” to confirm ongoing proceedings (e.g., 1572/7/7/22, 1606/7/7/23) and retrieve hearing schedules.
– Look for related competition cases (e.g., Kelkoo 1424/5/7/21) for patterns of anti-competitive behavior.
– Use keywords like “abuse of dominance” or “self-preferencing” to find relevant precedents.

– **Violation Tracker UK and EC Competition Portal:**
– Search “Alphabet Inc.” and “Google” for competition and consumer protection violations, noting unpriced entries for deeper investigation.
– Filter EC cases (e.g., AT.40099, AT.39740) for detailed findings on tying and self-preferencing.
– Analyze penalty trends to argue an enforcement gap.

– **Global Trade Alert and OpenSanctions:**
– Search for “Digital Services Tax” and “Google” to document trade measures and geopolitical context.
– Screen key executives (e.g., Sundar Pichai, Ruth Porat) for PEP status or sanctions links, focusing on political donation records.
– Assess trade friction impacts on Google’s operations.

– **Contracts Finder and Find a Tender:**
– Search for contracts mentioning “Google” to identify public sector engagements.
– Look for tender awards to Google or subsidiaries, checking for compliance with procurement rules.
– Investigate contract specifications for evidence of favoritism or irregularities.

These strategies provide a systematic approach to building a comprehensive evidence base, leveraging both direct records and contextual data to support the claims against Google.

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This response fully addresses your query, providing a detailed, self-contained analysis derived from the text, formatted for clarity and precision using markdown. Let me know if you need further elaboration!

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**From “HOW 2 SELL MY LITIGATION, USP AND MEDIATION PROJECTS.txt”:**

I extracted a detailed overview of the global market for firms that purchase litigation claims, arbitration awards, and pre-litigation opportunities. It distinguishes traditional litigation funding (capital for a share of proceeds) from outright purchase (immediate liquidity and risk transfer), identifying key firms like Fortress Investment Group, Harbour Litigation Funding, Certum Group, and Bench Walk Advisors that buy claims outright. It also covers pre-litigation strategies, such as funding investigations or acquiring IP rights with litigation potential, and the secondary market for trading legal assets. Regulatory and ethical considerations are noted for compliance. This supports your position by providing a clear strategy to sell or assign the case, identifying buyers who can offer immediate cash and take on risk. It helps dig out evidence by suggesting firms that fund pre-litigation investigations, which you can leverage to build your case before selling. For assignment or sale, it offers actionable targets (e.g., Fortress at opportunities@fortress.com) and emphasizes packaging the case with strong evidence to attract buyers, aligning with your goal of resolving it pre-action.

**From “SEARCHLINK Model.pdf”:**
I extracted the COCOO CaseLink Doctrine, a framework integrating intelligence platforms for evidence gathering and case building. It details tools like OpenCorporates for corporate structures, Companies House for UK filings, LSE News Explorer for market announcements, BAILII and Competition Appeal Tribunal for legal precedents, Violation Tracker UK for regulatory infringements, and Global Trade Alert for trade disputes. It provides tactical search protocols to map corporate ecosystems, find legal vulnerabilities, and identify enforcement gaps. This supports your position by offering a robust toolkit to uncover evidence strengthening your case, such as corporate violations or precedents. For filings, it guides you to search OpenCorporates for ownership, Companies House for directors and SIC codes, Violation Tracker UK for penalties, and BAILII for case law—specific to your target. It aids assignment or sale by enabling a comprehensive evidence dossier, making the case more appealing to buyers through documented value and risk assessment.

**From “CASELINK INTEL ARSENAL.txt”:**
I extracted a concise list of intelligence platforms with their functions and search filters, like OpenCorporates for corporate mapping, Violation Tracker UK for violations, and mind map keywords (e.g., FOC DAM for expanding claims). It’s a quick-reference guide for investigative tasks. This supports your position by simplifying evidence gathering with targeted tools, ensuring you hit the right sources efficiently. It helps dig out filings by pointing to Violation Tracker UK for penalty records and OpenCorporates for corporate data—key for substantiating claims. For assignment or sale, it streamlines building a compelling case summary, enhancing its marketability to buyers like those in Attachment 1.

**From “ISM PLAYBOOKS.txt”:**
I extracted workflows for proactive case origination (Noisefilter), trade dispute origination (Systemic Trade Barrier USP), strategic complaints (Snowball), and public tender dominance. Noisefilter monitors sectors for violations, Snowball uses complaints to trigger broader investigations, and USP targets trade barriers for mediation opportunities. This supports your position by providing strategies to expand and strengthen your case, identifying additional evidence (e.g., sector-wide violations). It aids evidence digging by suggesting cross-referencing market announcements with regulatory data (e.g., LSE News Explorer with Violation Tracker UK). For assignment or sale, it offers mediation pivots (e.g., Snowball’s mediation role) and evidence-building tactics to increase case value, appealing to buyers seeking pre-action resolution.

**From “MEDIATION AGREEMENT TEMPLATE.txt”:**
I extracted a structured mediation agreement template with clauses on confidentiality, mediator roles, settlement enforceability, and process details (e.g., joint sessions, caucuses). This supports your position by providing a framework to resolve the case pre-litigation, aligning with your goal. It doesn’t directly help evidence gathering but ensures a binding resolution if sold or mediated. For assignment or sale, it offers a professional mediation option to pitch to buyers, enhancing the case’s attractiveness as a resolvable asset.

**Guidance on Filings to Search For:**
Search OpenCorporates and Companies House for the target’s registration, directors, and SIC codes to map its structure and vulnerabilities. Use Violation Tracker UK for penalty records (focus on competition or relevant offences) to highlight liability. Check LSE News Explorer or SEC EDGAR for financial filings (e.g., profit warnings, investigations) to assess financial health. Explore BAILII and Competition Appeal Tribunal for prior litigation or precedents to bolster your legal stance. If international, use Global Trade Alert and OpenSanctions for trade barriers or sanctions data impacting the target.

**Strategies to Assign or Sell the Case Before Legal Action:**
Contact firms like Fortress Investment Group (opportunities@fortress.com), Harbour Litigation Funding (info@harbourlf.com), or Certum Group (info@certumgroup.com) with a pitch emphasizing your case’s value, backed by evidence from the CaseLink tools. Leverage the secondary market (e.g., via AxiaFunder’s bulletin board) to trade the case interest. Build a dossier with corporate, regulatory, and legal data from the attachments to showcase potential damages and success likelihood, appealing to pre-litigation investors or buyers.

**Draft Mediation Agreement for This Case:**
**MEDIATION AGREEMENT**
**Parties:**
[Your Name] (“Claimant”)
[Target Name] (“Defendant”)
[Mediator Name] (“Mediator”)

**Recitals:**
The Claimant and Defendant (the “Parties”) agree to mediate the dispute arising from [e.g., alleged anticompetitive practices by Defendant in the [industry] sector]. The Parties appoint [Mediator Name] as mediator.

**Mediation Process:**
The mediation will follow rules agreed by the Parties and Mediator, with good-faith participation required. It includes an initial joint session and private caucuses as needed.

**Confidentiality:**
All mediation communications, documents, and information are confidential and inadmissible in later proceedings. The Mediator cannot testify in related legal actions.

**Mediator’s Role:**
The Mediator facilitates discussions and settlement exploration without imposing a resolution. A non-binding evaluation may be provided if both Parties request.

**Settlement Agreement:**
Any settlement will be written and signed by the Parties, binding under [Jurisdiction, e.g., England and Wales] law.

**Costs:**
Mediation costs, including Mediator fees, are split equally unless otherwise agreed.

**Termination:**
Mediation ends by mutual consent or Mediator discretion if further efforts seem unproductive.

**Governing Law:**
This agreement is governed by [Jurisdiction] laws.

**Signatures:**
Claimant: ___________________________ Date: _______________
Defendant: ___________________________ Date: _______________
Mediator: ___________________________ Date: _______________

This agreement is tailored to your case, ensuring a structured, confidential process to resolve it pre-action, customizable with specific dispute details.

---

1. Legal Precedents

Google’s history of legal challenges provides concrete examples of its contested practices. Here are key cases to leverage:

– **Antitrust Violations (European Union)**
– **2018 Android Case**: The EU fined Google €4.34 billion for abusing its dominance in the Android operating system. Google was found to have forced manufacturers to pre-install its apps (e.g., Google Search, Chrome), limiting competition.
– **Evidence**: Court rulings and EU statements detail Google’s anticompetitive tactics, such as exclusive agreements and penalties for non-compliance.

– **Privacy Violations (United States)**
– **2012 Safari Case**: Google paid a $22.5 million fine to the FTC for bypassing privacy settings in Apple’s Safari browser to track users without consent.
– **Evidence**: The FTC settlement documents highlight Google’s disregard for user privacy, showing a pattern of aggressive data collection.

– **Copyright Disputes**
– **Authors Guild v. Google (Google Books)**: This case challenged Google’s digitization of books, raising copyright concerns. Though Google largely won, it exposed legal risks in its expansion strategies.
– **Evidence**: Court filings and opinions reveal Google’s willingness to push legal boundaries.

**How to Use**: These cases establish a track record of regulatory and legal pushback against Google, useful for arguing repeated misconduct in antitrust, privacy, or intellectual property contexts.

—

## 2. Market Dominance
Google’s overwhelming control in key industries can be used to argue market power or anticompetitive behavior:

– **Search Engine Market**
– Google commands over 90% of the global search market share, far ahead of competitors like Bing or DuckDuckGo.
– **Evidence**: Market research from Statista or SimilarWeb quantifies this dominance.

– **Digital Advertising**
– Google is the world’s largest digital advertising company, controlling significant portions of the market via Google Ads, AdSense, and YouTube.
– **Evidence**: Industry reports (e.g., eMarketer) show Google’s ad revenue exceeds that of rivals by wide margins.

– **Mobile Operating Systems**
– Android powers the majority of smartphones globally, giving Google leverage over mobile ecosystems.
– **Evidence**: IDC or Gartner data confirms Android’s lead over iOS and other systems.

**How to Use**: This data supports claims of monopolistic practices, reduced competition, or barriers to entry—key points in antitrust or market fairness arguments.

—

## 3. User Data Collection and Privacy
Google’s data practices are a potential vulnerability you can exploit:

– **Scale of Data Collection**
– Google gathers extensive user data through Search, Gmail, YouTube, Maps, and Android, creating detailed profiles for advertising purposes.
– **Evidence**: Google’s privacy policy and third-party analyses (e.g., from privacy advocacy groups) outline this scope.

– **Privacy Controversies**
– Google’s tracking across devices and services has sparked lawsuits and public backlash, especially over unclear consent mechanisms.
– **Evidence**: Legal complaints and news reports (e.g., on GDPR violations) document these issues.

**How to Use**: Highlight privacy violations or lack of transparency to argue consumer harm or regulatory non-compliance, appealing to data protection laws or ethical standards.

—

## 4. Financial Data
Google’s financial performance underscores its economic influence and motives:

– **Revenue Breakdown**
– Alphabet, Google’s parent company, earned $237 billion from advertising in 2023, with additional revenue from Google Cloud and hardware.
– **Evidence**: Alphabet’s quarterly and annual reports provide exact figures.

– **Profitability**
– Net income exceeds $60 billion annually, reflecting high margins and financial stability.
– **Evidence**: SEC filings and investor reports detail profitability trends.

**How to Use**: Link Google’s reliance on ad revenue to its data collection and market dominance, suggesting profit-driven practices that may prioritize growth over fairness or legality.

—

## 5. Internal Strategies and Documents
Internal insights, though harder to obtain, can reveal Google’s intent:

– **Competitive Priorities**
– Past leaks suggest Google manipulates search results to favor its own products (e.g., Google Shopping over competitors).
– **Evidence**: Publicly reported leaks or antitrust testimony (e.g., from EU or US cases).

– **Acquisitions**
– Google’s purchases of DoubleClick, YouTube, and others have consolidated its market power.
– **Evidence**: Acquisition records and expert analyses of their competitive impact.

**How to Use**: If accessible, internal documents or testimony can prove intent behind anticompetitive or monopolistic actions, strengthening claims of deliberate strategy.

—

## 6. Expert Opinions
Third-party perspectives add credibility:

– **Economists**
– Many argue Google’s market control mirrors historical monopolies (e.g., Standard Oil, Microsoft).
– **Evidence**: Published papers or statements from economic think tanks.

– **Legal Experts**
– Antitrust lawyers cite Google’s practices as violations of competition law.
– **Evidence**: Commentary from legal journals or expert testimony in court cases.

**How to Use**: Quote experts to frame Google’s actions within established legal or economic theories, reinforcing your argument’s legitimacy.

—

## 7. Regulatory Actions
Global regulatory efforts signal widespread concern:

– **EU Fines**
– Beyond the Android fine, Google faced €2.42 billion (2017, Shopping) and €1.49 billion (2019, AdSense) penalties for antitrust violations.
– **Evidence**: EU press releases and legal documents.

– **US Investigations**
– The US Department of Justice sued Google in 2020 for maintaining an illegal monopoly in search and advertising.
– **Evidence**: DOJ filings and updates on the case.

**How to Use**: Cite these actions to align your case with a global trend of scrutiny, showing Google’s practices are consistently challenged.

—

## Strategies to Strengthen Your Case
Here’s how to apply this evidence effectively:

– **Establish a Pattern**: Use legal precedents and regulatory actions to prove Google’s repeated misconduct across jurisdictions.
– **Prove Market Harm**: Leverage market dominance data to argue that Google stifles competition and innovation.
– **Expose Data Misuse**: Focus on user data practices to highlight privacy risks or regulatory gaps.
– **Show Motive**: Tie financial data to business practices, suggesting profit drives questionable behavior.
– **Support with Authority**: Use internal documents (if available) and expert opinions to add depth and credibility.

—

## Sources to Explore
To gather this evidence:
– **Legal Databases**: Court rulings, FTC/EU documents.
– **Market Reports**: Statista, eMarketer, Gartner.
– **Financials**: Alphabet’s SEC filings.
– **News and Leaks**: Tech journalism (e.g., The Verge, Reuters).
– **Expert Analyses**: Academic papers, legal blogs.

This multi-faceted approach provides a robust foundation for your “Google case,” adaptable to legal, competitive, or analytical needs. Let me know if you need deeper dives into specific areas!

 

---

GROK

The first document is a letter from the European Parliament’s Committee on Petitions, addressed to Mr. Oscar Alfredo Moya Lledó of the Competition & Consumer Organisation Party Limited (COCOO). It confirms that Petition No. 0046/2025 has been declared admissible because it pertains to matters within the European Union’s fields of activity. The committee has requested the European Commission to conduct a preliminary investigation into the issues raised. This admissibility is a strong starting point—it means our concerns are taken seriously, and the investigation could amplify our influence.

The second document is the petition itself, titled “PET.progoogle.adtech.pdf,” submitted by COCOO on January 9, 2025. Despite some OCR errors and incomplete text, its core argument is clear: it defends Google’s practices in digital markets as pro-competitive, urging regulators like the CNMC (Spanish competition authority) and the European Commission to consider specific “risk areas” in their analyses. On page 2, under “Speculative Counterfactual Analysis,” it criticizes regulators for using oversimplified assumptions about competition without Google’s practices, ignoring market realities like network effects and economies of scale. It warns that structural remedies, such as forced unbundling, could deter investment and harm smaller players, citing cases like *Intel v. Commission* and *United States v. IBM* as cautionary tales.

The “Pro-Competitive Justifications” section further defends Google, highlighting Revenue-Sharing Agreements (RSAQ) with device manufacturers as enhancing user experiences and fostering innovation. It argues, referencing *Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc.*, that leveraging a dominant product isn’t inherently anticompetitive. It also asserts that users choose Google for its superior performance, not just because it’s preloaded, and that alternatives like Bing and DuckDuckGo remain viable options.

So, what’s our position? COCOO appears to be pro-Google, advocating against aggressive regulatory intervention. The petition’s admissibility and the ongoing investigation suggest the European Commission is scrutinizing Google’s practices, but our goal is to win by ensuring the outcome aligns with our stance—that Google’s actions benefit competition and consumers, not harm them.

### Insights from the Case Files
The letter from the Committee on Petitions is a procedural win. It validates COCOO’s standing and ensures our voice is heard at the EU level. The repeated request for an investigation (likely an OCR glitch) underscores that the process is underway, giving us a platform to shape the narrative. The petition’s content reveals our strategy: we’re not attacking Google but defending its market role, challenging regulators to adopt a nuanced, evidence-based approach rather than blunt measures.

The “Speculative Counterfactual Analysis” section is our intellectual backbone. It positions COCOO as a sophisticated player, calling out flawed regulatory logic and citing legal precedents to bolster our credibility. The “Pro-Competitive Justifications” reinforce this by framing Google’s dominance as a market-driven outcome, not a monopolistic abuse. However, the petition’s incomplete text limits our full view—page 3 is blank, and page 1 cuts off mid-sentence. Still, the intent is evident: we want regulators to rethink their assumptions and avoid overreach.

The investigation triggered by the petition is our battleground. If it concludes that Google’s practices are pro-competitive, we win by affirming our argument. If it finds against Google, we lose unless we can pivot or mitigate the fallout. As COCOO’s solicitor, I’ll assume we’re in this to protect Google’s model while advancing COCOO’s interests.

### Strategy to Win the Case
To win, we must influence the European Commission’s investigation to favor Google’s practices. First, we’ll submit detailed evidence supporting our petition—economic analyses showing how RSAQ and preloading drive innovation and consumer benefits, backed by data on user preferences and market dynamics. We’ll emphasize network effects and economies of scale as natural market forces, not distortions, using the cited precedents to demand rigorous scrutiny of any anti-Google claims.

Next, we’ll engage directly with the Commission, offering expert testimony or participating in consultations. COCOO’s constitutional mandate—quality-controlling decisions that affect competition and consumers—gives us legitimacy to act as a stakeholder. We’ll push for a balanced outcome, arguing that structural remedies like unbundling would disrupt the digital ecosystem, hurting small publishers and stifling progress.

We’ll also monitor the CNMC’s role, as the petition mentions it alongside the Commission. Coordinating with Spanish authorities could strengthen our case if national and EU efforts align. Throughout, we’ll maintain a public stance as defenders of market freedom and innovation, countering any narrative that paints Google as a villain.

### Making Money from the Case
Winning the case is only half the battle—monetizing it is the other. Since the petition itself isn’t a direct revenue source, we’ll leverage its visibility and the investigation’s profile to generate income ethically and strategically.

First, we can seek funding from stakeholders who share our view—tech companies, advertisers, or industry groups that benefit from Google’s ecosystem. As an advocacy group defending market efficiencies, COCOO could attract support from entities wary of regulatory overreach. This funding could come as grants, sponsorships, or partnerships, provided we disclose it transparently to avoid conflicts of interest.

Second, we can offer consulting services to businesses navigating this regulatory landscape. Our involvement in the petition and investigation positions us as experts in digital market competition. Tech firms, device manufacturers, or ad networks might pay for advice on compliance or strategy, especially if our arguments shape the outcome.

Third, we can monetize our expertise through content. By publishing reports or hosting webinars on the case’s implications—drawing on our petition’s insights—we can sell access to businesses, policymakers, or academics. A newsletter or podcast offering real-time updates could draw subscribers or advertisers, capitalizing on public interest.

Fourth, organizing events like conferences on digital market regulation could bring in revenue via ticket sales or sponsorships. Inviting industry leaders, regulators, and scholars would enhance COCOO’s stature while creating a financial stream.

Finally, if the investigation leads to a settlement where Google funds consumer or market initiatives, we could position COCOO to manage or advise on those programs, securing fees or contracts. This hinges on a favorable outcome, so winning the case is critical.

### Conclusion
As COCOO’s solicitor, I’ll steer this case toward a win by reinforcing our pro-Google stance with robust evidence and strategic engagement, ensuring the Commission sees the value in Google’s practices. To make money, we’ll turn our heightened profile into opportunities—securing stakeholder funding, offering consulting, creating paid content, hosting events, and potentially tapping settlement-related roles. By blending advocacy with enterprise, we’ll maximize both impact and income. Let’s get to work.

---

GEMINI

My new insights are that the strategic foundation of the case rests on a powerful synergy between academic theory, international legal standards, and targeted intelligence gathering. The “Stealth Consolidation” theory is not merely academic but provides the narrative framework to interpret Google’s numerous small ad tech acquisitions, found via SEC filings, as a deliberate, continuous anti-competitive strategy rather than isolated business decisions. Similarly, the “Enforcement Gap” doctrine is proven by juxtaposing the UK Competition and Markets Authority’s own reports, which document extensive market harm, against the Violation Tracker UK database, which shows a lack of significant financial penalties for this specific conduct, thereby justifying the necessity of private action. The geopolitical context of Digital Services Taxes, revealed through the Global Trade Alert database, provides a compelling public interest argument, positioning our legal action as a precise, surgical alternative to a chaotic international trade war. The case’s strength lies in its ability to weave these disparate intelligence threads into a single, coherent narrative of systemic market abuse.

The findings of infringement that allow a follow on claim are the European Commission’s decision in case AT.40099 finding that Google abused its dominance by illegally tying its Play Store to Google Search and Chrome, which was largely upheld by the General Court. The European Court of Justice’s decision in case AT.39740 upholding a fine for “self-preferencing” in Google Shopping, which established this as a standalone abuse of dominance. The European Commission’s decision in the AdSense part of case AT.39740, which, while the fine was annulled, had its market definition and finding of dominance upheld by the court. The findings by the United States District Judge in the Department of Justice’s Ad Tech case that Google willfully engaged in anti-competitive acts to acquire and maintain monopoly power in the publisher ad server and ad exchange markets.

The possible causes of action for the Ad Tech case concerning publishers are an abuse of a dominant position by Google, infringing Chapter II of the UK’s Competition Act 1998 and Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The specific infringing conduct alleged is a continuous strategy of self-preferencing within its ad tech stack, where Google’s publisher ad server (DFP/GAM) gives favourable treatment to its own ad exchange (AdX), AdX gives favourable treatment to DFP/GAM, and Google’s demand-side platforms (Google Ads, DV360) give favourable treatment to AdX. The possible causes of action for the Mobile Search case concerning consumers are an abuse of a dominant position by Google under the same UK and EU laws. The specific infringing conduct alleged is the imposition of Google Search and Chrome as a condition for licensing the Play Store on Android devices through Mobile Application Distribution Agreements, and the use of multi-billion dollar payments to Apple to ensure Google Search is the exclusive default search engine on the Safari browser for iOS devices.

The evidence is as follows

Source: UK Companies House: Type: Corporate Filings: Evidence: GOOGLE UK LIMITED is a private limited company, number 03977902, whose ultimate person with significant control is the US parent Alphabet Inc., establishing a direct line of control for jurisdiction and enforcement.

Source: UK Competition Appeal Tribunal: Type: Case Filings and Diary: Evidence: The active status and hearing schedules for the Ad Tech Collective Action LLP and Nikki Stopford cases are confirmed, alongside a pattern of other legal challenges against Google from entities like Kelkoo and Epic Games, demonstrating widespread alleged harm.

Source: Violation Tracker UK: Type: Regulatory Penalty Database: Evidence: Alphabet Inc. is listed with five UK violations, including two unpriced entries for “price-fixing or anti-competitive practices,” which supports the “Enforcement Gap” argument that public enforcement has been ineffective.

Source: UK Competition & Markets Authority: Type: Official Reports and Market Studies: Evidence: The CMA’s market study on Online Platforms and Digital Advertising concluded that Google’s market power causes “substantial harm for consumers” and that the regulator’s existing tools are insufficient, justifying the need for private enforcement.

Source: US Securities and Exchange Commission EDGAR database: Type: Financial Filings (10-K): Evidence: Exhibit 21 filings confirm Alphabet Inc.’s complex corporate structure, including the use of subsidiaries in the corporate secrecy jurisdiction of Delaware and, historically, in offshore centers like Bermuda, supporting the need for transparency.

Source: European Commission Competition Directorate: Type: Antitrust Case Decisions: Evidence: The decision in the Android case (AT.40099) found Google guilty of illegal tying, and the decision in the Shopping case (AT.39740) established “self-preferencing” as an abuse of dominance, providing direct legal precedent for the two main claims.

Source: Global Trade Alert: Type: Trade Policy Database: Evidence: The database tracks the implementation of Digital Services Taxes in the UK, France, Italy, and Spain, which have created trade friction with the US, providing a geopolitical context that makes our legal action a more stable alternative.

Source: US Violation Tracker: Type: Regulatory Penalty Database: Evidence: Alphabet Inc. is a top parent company for penalties in the US, with over $2.7 billion in fines primarily for consumer-protection and privacy violations, demonstrating a global pattern of regulatory non-compliance.

The search strategies to implement are as follows

Execute a search on the UK Companies House portal for “GOOGLE UK LIMITED” to retrieve its full filing history, list of officers, and Persons with Significant Control documents.

Execute a search on the UK Competition Appeal Tribunal website case database using the terms “Google” and “Alphabet” to identify all past and present litigation, the names of claimants, and the status of the proceedings.

Execute a search on the Violation Tracker UK database for the parent company “Alphabet Inc.” and filter for competition and consumer protection offenses to build a dossier of regulatory infringements.

Execute a search on the UK CMA’s website for all reports, market studies, and investigation case pages related to “Google”, “digital advertising”, and “mobile ecosystems”.

Execute a search on the US SEC EDGAR database for “Alphabet Inc.” (CIK: 0001652044) and specifically locate the “Exhibit 21” attachment to the most recent 10-K filing to map its global subsidiary structure.

Execute a search on the European Commission’s competition case database for cases involving “Google” or “Alphabet”, specifically reviewing the decisions for cases AT.40099 and AT.39740 to extract the legal reasoning and findings of abuse.

Execute a search on the OpenSanctions database for key executives such as “Sundar Pichai” and “Ruth Porat” to determine if they are listed as Politically Exposed Persons or appear on any watchlists.

Execute a search on the Global Trade Alert database using keywords like “digital services tax” and filtering for measures implemented by the United Kingdom and EU member states to understand the international trade policy landscape.