SOLICITUD DE CONTRATO PUBLICO- GOOGLE Ad Tech Collective Action LLP v. Alphabet Inc. et al. case.

PROYECTO DE CONTRATACION PUBLICA : GOOGLE:

SOLICITUD DE PARTICIPACION    [ media campaign]   [communicaciones]

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Our media campaign is the engine that will drive the government towards a procurement decision. We begin by using our campaign to establish a recognised and undeniable “problem.” The X threads, LinkedIn articles, and Meta videos will not just be calls to action; they are instruments to frame the issue as a persistent and embarrassing failure of UK market regulation. Our narrative will consistently highlight the direct financial harm to British businesses, particularly SMEs, caused by the television advertising duopoly’s practices. We will use the Spanish regulatory failures as a cautionary tale, asking why our own regulators are not acting more effectively.

This campaign will generate the necessary political will. The LinkedIn articles, framed as white papers, will be sent directly to the DCMS Select Committee and the Public Accounts Committee, giving them the evidence needed to launch their own inquiries. The press-friendly infographics and stories on X and Meta are designed to land this issue on the desks of senior ministers and civil servants via negative headlines in the financial and trade press. Simultaneously, as advertisers and agencies register with us through the campaign’s call to action, we will mobilise them as a stakeholder group, creating a wave of pressure on Ofcom, the CMA, and their political representatives.

As the political cost of inaction rises, the internal government dialogue will inevitably shift. The “problem” will be acknowledged, and the need for a “solution” will become paramount to mitigate the reputational damage. This is where our campaign pressure converts into a procurement need. To ensure a fair and defensible process, the department cannot simply engage with us directly. They must formalise their requirement into a public tender for something like “expert consultancy on competition in the UK audiovisual market” or a “scoping study for a new fair-trading framework in media buying.” Our campaign’s victory is not in getting hired directly, but in forcing the creation of a tender that is tailor-made for our unique expertise.

This brings us to the shrewd tactic of a direct, below-threshold award. Our Unsolicited Proposal for a small, initial contract must be positioned as the only logical first step. Our argument for bypassing a competitive process will be based on our unique intellectual property and situational knowledge, framed as: “The analytical framework and the body of evidence we have gathered from harmed UK businesses during our collective action campaign are proprietary and unique to CoCoo. No other supplier has this foundational data, making a competitive process for this initial fact-finding phase a false economy.” We will propose a tightly-scoped, low-risk contract, for example: “A £9,800 Scoping Study to quantify the economic detriment to UK advertisers from prevailing anti-competitive practices and to propose a pilot redress framework.”

This proposal will be a detailed Statement of Work. It will define the problem as the systematic financial harm to UK businesses that the current regulatory model fails to address. Our solution will be the development of a transparent Redress Framework. The deliverables will be a detailed harm-quantification report and a blueprint for a new fair-trading code. The document will outline our expert team and a fixed price of £9,800 for this initial study. We will conclude by stating that CoCoo is prepared to engage with the relevant commercial department to capture this scope of work within the appropriate government service contract, making it as easy as possible for them to say yes.

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LICITACIONES EN ESPANA EN RELACCION A ESTE CASO

Entendido. He procesado su estrategia y he buscado en los portales de contratación pública españoles licitaciones que se ajusten a su enfoque. Su objetivo es encontrar oportunidades donde una campaña de presión pueda culminar en un proceso de contratación, específicamente apuntando a contratos de bajo valor para estudios o consultorías especializadas.

A continuación, presento un análisis de las plataformas y los resultados de la búsqueda de licitaciones.

Análisis de las Plataformas Indicadas

1. Plataforma de Contratación del Sector Público (contrataciondelestado.es): Correcto. Este es el portal central y correcto para buscar licitaciones públicas abiertas (licitaciones abiertas) y próximas en España. Mi búsqueda se ha centrado aquí.

2. Registro Oficial de Licitadores (ROLECE): Este no es un portal para buscar licitaciones. El ROLECE es un registro de empresas. Su finalidad es que una compañía como la suya (COCOO) se inscriba para acreditar su personalidad jurídica, solvencia y capacidad para contratar con el sector público español. La inscripción aquí es un requisito previo obligatorio para participar en muchos tipos de licitaciones, ya que simplifica el proceso al no tener que presentar la misma documentación en cada oferta. Por tanto, es un paso administrativo que su organización debería realizar para poder ejecutar su estrategia en España.

Resultados de Licitaciones y Relevancia Estratégica

He encontrado varios ejemplos que demuestran la viabilidad de su táctica de “contrato menor” para “estudios de viabilidad” y “asistencia técnica”. Estos son los tipos exactos de oportunidades de bajo riesgo que un organismo público podría crear para abordar un “problema” que su campaña haya puesto de manifiesto.

A continuación se muestran ejemplos relevantes que, aunque no están directamente relacionados con el caso “Google”, ilustran el tipo de contrato al que deben aspirar:

Ejemplo 1: Contrato Menor de Asistencia Técnica (Táctica Directa)

• Licitación: “Contrato Menor Servicios Asistencia Técnica en materia de Ingeniería Civil”
• Organismo Licitador: No especificado en el extracto, pero es un organismo público español.
• Presupuesto: 4.980,00 Euros (Aproximadamente £4,200).
• Enlace: Acceso a la Licitación
• Análisis de Relevancia Estratégica: Este es un ejemplo perfecto de su táctica de “Below-Threshold Direct Award”. Es un “contrato menor” (la figura legal española para contratos de bajo valor con procedimiento simplificado) para una “asistencia técnica”. Demuestra que los organismos públicos españoles utilizan este mecanismo para adquirir conocimientos externos muy específicos. Su propuesta para un “Scoping Study” de £9,500 encajaría perfectamente en este modelo, justificándolo por su experiencia única (“unique expertise”) y propiedad intelectual (“proprietary intellectual property”).

Ejemplo 2: Contrato Menor de Consultoría (Táctica Directa)

• Licitación: “Contrato Menor de Servicio de Consultoría y Asistencia Técnica Urbanística Municipal”
• Organismo Licitador: Concello de Quiroga (Ayuntamiento de Quiroga, Lugo).
• Presupuesto: 9.075,00 Euros (Aproximadamente £7,660).
• Enlace: Acceso a la Licitación
• Análisis de Relevancia Estratégica: Similar al anterior, este es otro ejemplo ideal. El objeto es “consultoría y asistencia técnica”, lo que se alinea directamente con su oferta de un “POPIA Framework” o un “Non-Visible Wealth Impact Assessment (NVWIA) Toolkit”. Muestra que los ayuntamientos y otros organismos locales también publican este tipo de contratos a los que su organización podría aspirar.

Ejemplo 3: Informe de Viabilidad (Validación del Concepto)

• Documento: “INFORME DE VIABILIDAD PARA LA CONTRATACIÓN DE LA PRESTACIÓN DEL SERVICIO DE RESTAURACIÓN…”
• Organismo: Ministerio de Defensa (Armada).
• Enlace: Acceso al Documento
• Análisis de Relevancia Estratégica: Este documento no es una licitación abierta, sino el informe interno que justifica la necesidad de una. Esto es crucial porque demuestra el proceso que usted describió: el organismo público primero reconoce internamente una necesidad y la formaliza en un “informe de viabilidad” antes de que se convierta en una licitación. Su campaña de presión debe tener como objetivo forzar la creación de un documento similar sobre, por ejemplo, “la necesidad de un marco de supervisión financiera externa debido a irregularidades detectadas”.

Conclusión y Estrategia Recomendada para España

1. La Táctica es Viable: La búsqueda confirma que su estrategia de apuntar a “contratos menores” para “estudios de viabilidad”, “consultoría” o “asistencia técnica” es una táctica totalmente viable en el marco de la contratación pública española.

2. Palabras Clave para la Búsqueda: Para monitorizar futuras oportunidades, debe buscar en la Plataforma de Contratación del Sector Público utilizando las siguientes palabras clave en español:

   • Contrato menor
   • Estudio de viabilidad
   • Servicios de consultoría
   • Asistencia técnica
   • Informe de viabilidad / Estudio de alcance

3. Acción Inmediata Requerida: Antes de poder participar en cualquier licitación, su organización debe inscribirse en el ROLECE (Registro Oficial de Licitadores y Empresas Clasificadas del Estado).

4. Adaptación de la Propuesta: Su “Unsolicited Proposal” (USP) debe ser traducida y adaptada. En lugar de “Scoping Study”, utilice los términos españoles “Estudio de Viabilidad” o “Informe de Alcance”. La justificación de la adjudicación directa por “propiedad intelectual única” es una base sólida.

No encontré licitaciones abiertas para “supervisión de mercados” o “prácticas de competencia”, ya que estos son problemas que el gobierno investiga, pero rara vez licita a consultores externos de esta manera. La ruta más probable es la que usted ha diseñado: presionar sobre el problema (prácticas anticompetitivas) para forzar una necesidad de solución (contrato de consultoría para mejorar la supervisión)

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These documents primarily provide guidance on Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), the nature and submission of Unsolicited Proposals (USPs) to government bodies, and government contract selection.

Key Learnings from the New Files Relevant to Crafting Unsolicited Proposals:

• PPPs aim for cost-effectiveness and risk transfer to the private sector, potentially leading to higher quality outcomes if planned and managed well. Key features include providing service-enabling infrastructure, risk sharing, and contributions from government/private sector/users.
• Unsolicited Proposals (USPs) can be accepted by government bodies, especially if they are unique, innovative, and offer value (e.g., cost/time savings, risk minimization). Some UK government customers (like DSTL’s) can accept USPs at their discretion.
• A strong USP should clearly articulate its benefits, be unique/innovative, identify how Intellectual Property (IP) is protected, demonstrate achievable results (even with proprietary figures), include a price, and enable value-for-money assessment. It should address specific needs and be professionally presented.
• The value of a USP is to get innovative ideas in front of a customer, especially if the customer is hard to access or “protected by a gatekeeper”.
• Protecting information in USPs: The offeror can mark proprietary information to restrict its disclosure and use by the government. Government personnel should not use concepts from a USP as a basis for a solicitation with another firm unless the offeror agrees. This is crucial for your “special strategy/IP” argument.
• Government contract selection guides outline different contract types based on complexity, value, and risk. This helps in understanding how a proposal might be categorized.

These new files do not directly strengthen the merits of the Ad Tech Collective Action LLP v. Google case itself but provide a comprehensive framework for how COCOO, representing the victims, can structure and justify unsolicited proposals to public authorities, arguing for direct engagement due to unique capabilities and IP.

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Here are the unsolicited project proposals based on the problem/solutions identified previously, incorporating insights from all provided documents and your specific requirements:

Proposal 1: Unsolicited Proposal for the Establishment of a Dynamic Ad Tech Market Integrity Monitoring System (DATMIS)

To:

The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA)

The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT)

HM Treasury (Cabinet Office – Commercial Policy Team)

From: The Competition & Consumer Organisation Party Limited (COCOO), on behalf of its Members (UK Publishers and Ad Tech Businesses affected by Digital Market Distortions)

Date: 1 June 2025

Subject: Unsolicited Proposal – Urgent Development and Implementation of a Dynamic Ad Tech Market Integrity Monitoring System (DATMIS) to Address Systemic Competition Issues and Market Opacity.

1. Introduction and Urgency:

The UK’s digital advertising market, vital to our digital economy, faces significant challenges regarding transparency and fair competition. Ongoing litigation, notably the Ad Tech Collective Action LLP v. Alphabet Inc. et al. ([2024] CAT 38) case certified by the Competition Appeal Tribunal, highlights deep-seated concerns about abuse of dominance, self-preferencing by large platforms, and the inherent opacity of the ad tech stack. As evidenced by the findings in the U.S. DOJ’s case against Google, where similar conduct led to findings of monopolization, the risks to UK businesses are substantial and ongoing. The UK CMA’s own provisional findings also point to Google using its market power to hinder competition. This situation necessitates an urgent, proactive, and innovative solution to restore and maintain market integrity, beyond reactive enforcement or lengthy litigation.

2. Problem Statement:

The core problems, as extensively detailed in the aforementioned UK legal proceedings and supported by international precedents, are:

* Abuse of Dominant Positions: Systemic self-preferencing by dominant ad tech providers, distorting competition and harming UK publishers and advertisers.

* Market Opacity: The ad tech ecosystem’s complexity and lack of transparency prevent effective scrutiny, mask anti-competitive practices, and hinder fair value discovery for market participants.

* Economic Harm: Publishers suffer from depressed ad prices and inflated commission rates, while innovation is stifled due to unfair competitive conditions.

Without a dedicated monitoring system, these issues will persist, leading to further economic damage to UK businesses and potentially more widespread, costly, and protracted legal challenges. This creates an unstable market environment and undermines the UK’s ambition to be a leading digital economy.

3. Proposed Solution: The Dynamic Ad Tech Market Integrity Monitoring System (DATMIS)

COCOO proposes the collaborative development and deployment of DATMIS, a sophisticated, real-time (or near real-time) system designed to:

* Monitor Key Market Metrics: Track pricing dynamics, auction mechanics, commission rates, and data flows across the ad tech stack.

* Detect Anomalies and Red Flags: Employ advanced analytics and AI to identify patterns indicative of self-preferencing, exclusionary conduct, or other anti-competitive behaviours.

* Enhance Transparency: Provide regulators (and potentially, in aggregated/anonymised forms, market participants) with actionable insights into market operations.

* Support Proactive Regulation: Enable the CMA and other relevant bodies to intervene more swiftly and effectively, based on robust data.

This system represents a service-enabling public infrastructure designed to improve market services.

4. COCOO’s Unique Position, Proprietary Strategy, and Intellectual Property:

COCOO and its members (the direct victims of the identified market distortions) are uniquely positioned to deliver this project effectively and rapidly:

* Proprietary “Victim-Centric Anomaly Detection” (VCAD) Framework: Developed through an unparalleled depth of analysis of members’ direct experiences, transactional data, and harm quantification methodologies (akin to those presented by Dr. Latham in the CAT 38 case). This VCAD framework forms the core IP of our proposed monitoring system, allowing for the identification of subtle yet harmful practices that generic systems would miss.

* Unrivalled Data Access & Insight: Our members, UK publishers and ad tech firms, possess granular, real-world data and operational insights essential for designing, calibrating, and validating DATMIS. This direct access, governed by strict NDAs and data-sharing protocols within our consortium, cannot be replicated by any other potential contractor.

* Special Strategic Focus: COCOO’s mandate involves quality-controlling decisions that impact competition and consumer welfare. While we have engaged critically with various regulatory approaches globally, our current focus, driven by our UK membership, is on constructive, evidence-based solutions that restore market fairness. This unique 360-degree perspective informs our system design.

5. Justification for Direct Award/Minimal Tender (The “Implied Litigation Threat” Context):

The urgency of the market situation, coupled with COCOO’s unique VCAD Framework IP and direct conduit to the victims’ data and expertise, presents a compelling case for a direct award or a significantly expedited procurement process.

* Uniqueness & Innovation: DATMIS, powered by VCAD, is a novel solution directly tailored to the specific harms evident in the UK ad tech market. Standard procurement processes are ill-suited for such innovative, IP-led solutions where the proposing entity holds unique, foundational knowledge. As per guidance, USPs are valuable to “get your innovative technical or commercial ideas in front of the customer”.

* Speed of Deployment: A lengthy tender process would delay the implementation of critical market oversight, allowing further harm to accrue to UK businesses. COCOO can commence work immediately.

* Mitigation of Further Litigation & Market Instability: The ongoing CAT 38 collective action is a symptom of systemic market failure. While DATMIS is not a direct remedy for past harms claimed in that specific litigation, its implementation would demonstrably address the root causes, improve market function, and reduce the likelihood of future, similar, widespread legal challenges and associated regulatory burdens. Failure to address these systemic issues proactively and urgently with a tailored solution like DATMIS risks entrenching the problems, inevitably leading to more extensive regulatory interventions and litigation down the line. Our proposal is a means to “minimise risks” for the public sector and the market.

* IP Protection: Our VCAD framework is proprietary. As per guidance, government use of ideas from USPs for solicitations with other firms should only occur with the offeror’s agreement. Engaging COCOO directly protects this IP and ensures its optimal application.

6. Value Proposition:

* Targeted Solution: Directly addresses proven and alleged market failures.

* Cost-Effectiveness: Proactive monitoring is significantly more cost-effective than repeated, lengthy investigations and litigation. Prevents further loss to UK businesses.

* Expertise: Leverages the unparalleled, direct experience and data of those most affected.

* Enhanced Regulatory Capacity: Provides the CMA/DSIT with cutting-edge tools and insights.

7. Project Outline (Illustrative):

* Phase 1 (3 Months): Co-design and Scoping. Workshops with CMA/DSIT, COCOO members. Finalise DATMIS architecture based on VCAD. Data-sharing protocols.

* Phase 2 (6-9 Months): System Development & Pilot. Agile development of DATMIS. Pilot with a subset of COCOO members.

* Phase 3 (Ongoing): Full Deployment, Operation & Enhancement. Handover or ongoing managed service. Continuous improvement.

8. Call to Action & Confidentiality:

This proposal contains commercially sensitive and proprietary information, including the conceptual basis of our VCAD framework, and is submitted in confidence. We request an urgent meeting with representatives from the CMA, DSIT, and the Cabinet Office to discuss this proposal in detail, under an appropriate Non-Disclosure Agreement, to explore how DATMIS can be rapidly deployed to safeguard the UK ad tech market. We believe this initiative aligns with the principles of securing value for money through innovative public-private collaboration.

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Proposal 2: Unsolicited Proposal for the Co-Development of “FairStack” Ad Tech Interoperability and Transparency Standards

To:

The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA)

The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT)

The Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation (CDEI)

From: The Competition & Consumer Organisation Party Limited (COCOO), on behalf of its Members (UK Publishers and Ad Tech Businesses affected by Digital Market Distortions)

Date: 1 June 2025

Subject: Unsolicited Proposal – Co-Development and Facilitation of “FairStack” Interoperability and Enhanced Transparency Standards for the UK Ad Tech Ecosystem.

1. Introduction and Urgency:

The integrity of the UK’s digital advertising ecosystem is compromised by alleged anti-competitive practices, including self-preferencing and the creation of “walled gardens” by dominant ad tech platforms. The Ad Tech Collective Action LLP v. Alphabet Inc. et al. ([2024] CAT 38) litigation underscores the severe disadvantages faced by UK publishers and independent ad tech providers due to these practices. International findings, such as those in the U.S. DOJ v. Google Ad Tech case which identified unlawful tying between Google’s AdX and DFP services, and the UK CMA’s provisional findings of Google hindering competition, signal an urgent need for structural solutions that promote genuine choice and fair access.

2. Problem Statement:

* Exclusionary Bundling & Tying: Dominant platforms allegedly leverage their control over critical ad tech components (e.g., ad servers, exchanges) to disadvantage rival services, restrict interoperability, and lock in customers.

* Lack of Transparency in Auction Dynamics: Publishers and advertisers often lack clear visibility into how ad auctions are conducted, how revenue is shared, and why certain bids win, fostering an environment where manipulation can occur.

* Stifled Innovation and Competition: Barriers to entry and expansion for independent ad tech providers are heightened, reducing choice and innovation for UK businesses.

Addressing these issues through isolated enforcement actions is insufficient. A systemic, industry-involved approach to standard-setting is required to create a level playing field.

3. Proposed Solution: The “FairStack” Initiative

COCOO proposes to facilitate and lead the co-development of “FairStack” Standards – a suite of technical and operational standards for interoperability and transparency in the UK ad tech market. This initiative would:

* Define clear guidelines for fair access to essential ad tech functionalities.

* Promote open standards for data exchange between different ad tech components, reducing lock-in.

* Establish minimum transparency requirements for ad auction processes and revenue reporting.

* Create a framework for the verification of compliance with these standards.

This initiative is a form of strategic risk management and service improvement, aligning with PPP principles of leveraging private sector expertise for public benefit.

4. COCOO’s Unique Position, Proprietary Strategy, and Intellectual Property:

* Coalition of the Aggrieved & Expert Insights: COCOO uniquely represents a broad consortium of UK businesses (publishers, independent ad tech providers) directly harmed by the current market structure. Their collective, firsthand experience of exclusionary tactics and opacity provides an unparalleled foundation for designing practical and effective standards.

* Proprietary “Equitable Ad Tech Architecture” (EATA) Principles: COCOO has developed the EATA Principles, a conceptual IP framework outlining a pro-competitive, interoperable ad tech stack. These principles, derived from extensive analysis of the harms suffered by our members and the technical means of their infliction, will serve as the foundational blueprint for the FairStack Standards.

* Neutral Facilitation & Consensus Building: COCOO can act as a trusted, neutral facilitator in a multi-stakeholder process (including dominant players, if willing, under CMA oversight) due to its deep understanding of the issues from the perspective of those disadvantaged.

5. Justification for Direct Award/Minimal Tender (The “Implied Litigation Threat” Context):

* Unique Constituent Representation & IP: The FairStack initiative, underpinned by the EATA Principles and driven by the direct experiences of a significant portion of the UK ad tech market (COCOO’s members), cannot be replicated by a generalist consultancy. Awarding this project through an open tender would risk diluting the victim-centric insights crucial for effective standard-setting and may not adequately protect COCOO’s EATA conceptual IP.

* Urgency and Proactive Problem Solving: The market distortions are current and damaging. A rapid, collaborative standard-setting process is essential. Failure to establish such standards proactively means that any future remedies imposed by courts or regulators (as seen in the U.S. DOJ case which explores divestiture) may be less effective, harder to implement, or face legal challenges, thereby prolonging market uncertainty and harm. This project is an opportunity to preemptively “minimise risks”.

* Ensuring Effective Remedies: The FairStack standards can inform and facilitate the practical implementation of any future conduct remedies mandated by the CMA or courts, ensuring they are technically sound and achieve their pro-competitive aims. Without such industry-grounded standards, remedies might be subverted.

6. Value Proposition:

* Restored Competition: Promotes a more level playing field, fostering innovation and choice.

* Increased Transparency: Builds trust and empowers publishers/advertisers.

* Reduced Regulatory Burden: Proactive standard-setting can reduce the need for repeated, costly regulatory interventions.

* UK Leadership: Positions the UK as a leader in establishing fair digital market practices.

7. Project Outline (Illustrative):

* Phase 1 (2 Months): Stakeholder Mobilisation & Governance Framework. Establish working groups with COCOO members, CMA, DSIT, CDEI. Define governance for FairStack Initiative.

* Phase 2 (6 Months): Standards Co-Development based on EATA Principles. Technical and policy drafting workshops. Public consultation on draft standards.

* Phase 3 (4 Months): Finalisation & Pilot Implementation Plan. Refine standards. Develop compliance verification framework and plan for pilot adoption.

8. Call to Action & Confidentiality:

This proposal, including the EATA Principles, is proprietary and submitted in confidence. COCOO urges the CMA, DSIT, and CDEI to engage in an urgent discussion about launching the FairStack Initiative. We believe this collaborative approach is the most effective path to achieving a genuinely fair and competitive UK ad tech market. This proposal provides an innovative vehicle for the government to partner with directly affected industry players to achieve critical policy objectives.

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Proposal 3: Unsolicited Proposal for an Independent Ad Tech Audit and Verification Programme (ATAVP)

To:

The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA)

The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) (regarding data practices in ad tech)

From: The Competition & Consumer Organisation Party Limited (COCOO), on behalf of its Members (UK Publishers and Ad Tech Businesses affected by Digital Market Distortions)

Date: 1 June 2025

Subject: Unsolicited Proposal – Establishing an Independent Ad Tech Audit and Verification Programme (ATAVP) to Ensure Compliance, Transparency, and Fair Conduct.

1. Introduction and Urgency:

The lack of transparency and potential for hidden anti-competitive practices within the complex ad tech supply chain are significant concerns, as highlighted by ongoing legal actions like Ad Tech Collective Action LLP v. Alphabet Inc. et al. ([2024] CAT 38) and regulatory scrutiny globally. The U.S. DOJ’s successful Ad Tech case against Google, revealing practices like self-preferencing and leveraging dominance, and the UK CMA’s provisional findings, demonstrate the critical need for robust mechanisms to verify conduct and ensure compliance with competition and data protection laws. Current oversight is insufficient to address the sophisticated and often opaque nature of ad tech operations.

2. Problem Statement:

* Difficulty in Detecting Abuse: The technical complexity of ad tech makes it challenging for individual businesses and even regulators to detect subtle forms of self-preferencing, discriminatory conduct, or data misuse.

* Ensuring Compliance with Remedies/Regulations: If and when conduct remedies are imposed on dominant ad tech platforms, or new codes of conduct are introduced, verifying ongoing compliance will be a significant challenge without specialized, independent auditing.

* Information Asymmetry: Dominant platforms possess vastly more information about their operations than their customers or regulators, creating an imbalance that can perpetuate unfair practices.

Without a credible, independent audit programme, any efforts to reform the ad tech market risk being ineffective, leading to continued harm and a lack of trust.

3. Proposed Solution: The Ad Tech Audit and Verification Programme (ATAVP)

COCOO proposes the establishment of ATAVP, an independent programme to conduct rigorous audits of ad tech platforms, focusing on:

* Algorithmic Transparency: Assessing how algorithms make decisions in ad auctions and inventory allocation.

* Data Usage: Verifying compliance with data protection regulations (e.g., GDPR) and fair data handling practices.

* Non-Discrimination: Auditing for evidence of unfair self-preferencing or discriminatory treatment of third-party services/clients.

* Compliance with Codes/Remedies: Verifying adherence to any existing or future regulatory requirements or industry codes of conduct.

The ATAVP would provide a crucial service-enabling infrastructure for a well-functioning market.

4. COCOO’s Unique Position, Proprietary Strategy, and Intellectual Property:

* “Harm-Focused Audit Methodology” (HFAM) IP: COCOO has developed a proprietary HFAM, built upon the collective experiences and documented harms of its member base (UK publishers and ad tech businesses). This methodology is specifically designed to identify audit red flags and investigate areas most susceptible to the types of anti-competitive conduct seen in cases like CAT 38. It focuses on outcomes and impacts on smaller players, which generic audits might overlook.

* Access to Specialized Expertise: Through its membership, COCOO can assemble and train a unique pool of auditors with deep, practical expertise in ad tech operations and the specific ways in which current systems can be exploited or lead to unfair outcomes.

* Trusted Intermediary: COCOO can act as a credible intermediary between auditees, auditors, and regulators, ensuring the integrity and focus of the audit process.

5. Justification for Direct Award/Minimal Tender (The “Implied Litigation Threat” Context):

* Proprietary Methodology: The HFAM is unique to COCOO and is essential for conducting audits that are truly effective in the ad tech context. A tender would not be able to specify this methodology, and alternative approaches would likely lack the depth of understanding derived from actual victim experiences. We assert our right to control the use of our HFAM IP.

* Urgent Need for Trust & Verification: The market currently operates with a significant trust deficit. Establishing the ATAVP rapidly is key to rebuilding confidence and ensuring any market reforms or remedies are meaningful. Delaying through a protracted tender allows harmful practices to potentially continue unchecked.

* Preventing Future Disputes and Regulatory Failure: Without such a robust audit programme, non-compliance with existing laws or future remedies is highly probable, leading to further cycles of investigation, litigation (as seen with the ongoing CAT 38 case), and economic damage. The ATAVP offers a proactive mechanism to “minimise risks” of regulatory failure and sustained market abuse. The “implied threat” is that without such a rigorous, victim-informed audit system, true compliance will remain elusive, and the conditions for further legal action will persist.

6. Value Proposition:

* Enhanced Compliance: Increases adherence to legal and regulatory obligations.

* Increased Market Trust: Provides credible, independent verification of ad tech practices.

* Informed Regulation: Supplies regulators with detailed insights for evidence-based policymaking.

* Deterrence of Misconduct: The prospect of rigorous, specialized audits acts as a deterrent.

7. Project Outline (Illustrative):

* Phase 1 (3 Months): Programme Design & Auditor Accreditation. Develop detailed ATAVP framework and HFAM protocols with CMA/ICO. Establish criteria and process for accrediting specialist auditors.

* Phase 2 (Ongoing): Pilot Audits & Programme Rollout. Conduct pilot audits of volunteer (or mandated) ad tech platforms. Refine process. Scale up programme.

* Phase 3 (Ongoing): Reporting & Evolution. Regular reporting of aggregated findings to regulators. Continuous improvement of audit methodologies.

8. Call to Action & Confidentiality:

This proposal, including the HFAM concept, is proprietary and submitted in confidence. COCOO requests an urgent meeting with the CMA and ICO to discuss the critical need for the ATAVP and how our unique position and methodology can ensure its success. We are ready to demonstrate how this programme can deliver significant “value for money” in terms of market integrity and reduced enforcement costs.

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Okay, I will identify the underlying problems and proposed solutions based on the provided documents, focusing on the Ad Tech Collective Action LLP v. Alphabet Inc. et al. case ([2024] CAT 38) as “this particular case.”

Underlying Problems (giving rise to possible causes of action in Ad Tech Collective Action LLP v. Alphabet Inc. et al.):

The central problem identified in the Ad Tech Collective Action LLP v. Alphabet Inc. et al. case ([2024] CAT 38) is Google’s alleged abuse of its dominant position in various interconnected markets within the digital advertising technology (“ad tech”) stack. This alleged abuse is claimed to have harmed publishers and advertisers.

1. Abuse of Dominance through Self-Preferencing:

   • Description: Ad Tech alleges that Google, which holds a dominant position in the markets for publisher ad servers, Supply-Side Platforms (SSPs), and Demand-Side Platforms (DSPs), has abused this dominance by favoring its own services over those of its competitors. This self-preferencing is alleged to occur across multiple levels of the ad tech stack.
   • Specific Allegations (The Three Abuses):
     • Google’s publisher ad server (DFP) allegedly treated its own SSP (AdX) more favorably than rival SSPs (First Abuse).
     • Google’s AdX allegedly treated its own publisher ad server (DFP) more favorably than rival publisher ad servers (Second Abuse).
     • Google’s DSPs (Google Ads and DV360) allegedly treated its own AdX more favorably than rival SSPs (Third Abuse).
   • Nature of Conduct: These practices are characterized as abusive self-preferencing that represents a departure from normal competition on the merits and is capable of producing anti-competitive effects without objective justification.
   • Cause of Action: Infringement of the Chapter II prohibition of the Competition Act 1998 and, for certain periods, Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

2. Anti-Competitive Effects and Harm to the Class:

   • Description: Google’s alleged abusive conduct is claimed to have distorted competition in the ad tech markets, leading to financial losses for the proposed class members (primarily publishers).
   • Specific Harms Alleged (as per Dr. Latham’s analysis):
     • Gross price effect: Depressed prices for programmatic ads sold by publishers due to less competitive auctions.
     • Take rate effect: Higher SSP commission charges (“take rates”) due to weakened competition in the SSP market.
     • Umbrella effects: Reduced revenue from publishers’ direct sales and sales through ad networks, as these faced less competitive pressure from SSPs.
     • Overhang damages: Long-term persistence of harm even if the abusive conduct ceases, due to accumulated advantages for Google and difficulty for rivals to recover.
   • Cause of Action: Claims for damages arising from the alleged anti-competitive conduct.

3. Opacity and Complexity of the Ad Tech Market:

   • Description: The detailed operation of ad tech services is described as technical and “often opaque not only to outsiders but to many of the publisher and advertiser clients that use them”. This complex and layered market environment is one where it is arguable that Google could discriminate and favor itself.
   • Implication: This opacity can hinder the ability of market participants to detect and challenge anti-competitive practices, and for competition to function effectively. While not a direct cause of action itself, it’s a condition that facilitates the alleged abuses.

Proposed Solutions (that may require a public contract or PPP partnership, drawing from the context of the problems identified):

The Ad Tech Collective Action LLP case is primarily seeking damages for past harm through a Collective Proceedings Order (CPO). However, the underlying problems highlighted by the case could suggest areas where public contracts or Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) might be considered as broader, forward-looking solutions to ensure market fairness and competitiveness.

1. Enhanced Market Monitoring and Regulatory Oversight Tools:

   • Problem Addressed: Abuse of dominance, opacity of the ad tech market.
   • Proposed Solution: Public competition authorities (like the CMA in the UK) could require ongoing, enhanced monitoring of the ad tech markets.
     • Public Contract: The authority could contract with specialized technology firms or economic consultancies to develop and operate sophisticated market monitoring tools. These tools could analyze auction data, pricing, and market shares in real-time (or near real-time) to detect anomalies or potentially anti-competitive behavior. This aligns with the Tribunal’s need to manage complex issues of fact, economics, and technology.
     • PPP: A partnership between the regulator, academic institutions, and independent technology providers could establish a neutral “Ad Tech Observatory” or research center. This body could conduct ongoing research, publish findings on market dynamics, and develop best practice guidelines, funded jointly or through public grants.

2. Development and Implementation of Interoperability/Access Remedies and Transparency Standards:

   • Problem Addressed: Self-preferencing and exclusionary effects of Google’s conduct.
   • Proposed Solution: Should Google be found liable and remedies beyond damages be considered (as often happens in such competition cases, for instance, the DOJ’s Ad Tech case in the US contemplates divestiture [Video 3, 0:08-0:23]), a public body would need to oversee the design and implementation of these.
     • Public Contract: If a remedy involves mandating fair access or interoperability for rival ad tech providers with Google’s services, the competition authority could commission technical experts to help define the necessary technical standards, APIs, and access protocols. These experts would work under contract to ensure the remedies are technically feasible and effective.
     • PPP: A multi-stakeholder initiative, including the regulator, Google, competitors, publishers, and advertisers, could be formed to co-design, implement, and govern interoperability standards or a code of conduct for fair dealing in the ad tech stack. This could also involve establishing a system for greater transparency in ad auctions and revenue flows, potentially through jointly developed auditing mechanisms or reporting frameworks. This addresses the “opaque” nature of the market.

3. Independent Audit and Verification of Ad Tech Practices:

   • Problem Addressed: Opacity of the market and ensuring compliance with any potential remedies or codes of conduct.
   • Proposed Solution: Establishment of a system for independent audits of dominant ad tech platforms.
     • Public Contract: A competition authority could establish a panel of pre-approved, independent auditors (technical and economic experts). Companies subject to remedies, or participating in voluntary transparency schemes, would be required to undergo regular audits, funded by them but with auditors selected from or approved by the public panel, reporting to the authority.
     • PPP: An industry-funded but independently governed body, with regulatory oversight, could be created to set audit standards, accredit auditors, and publish aggregated, anonymized findings to enhance market understanding and trust.

4. Support for Data Analysis and Expert Evidence Development in Collective Actions:

   • Problem Addressed: The challenge for class representatives in accessing and analyzing complex data, much of which may be in the defendant’s possession, and the significant costs involved.
   • Proposed Solution: While not a direct PPP for this case’s solution, a public fund or a publicly supported framework could assist in future complex collective actions to ensure access to justice.
     • Public Contract: A public body could create a roster of vetted economic and data science experts available to be contracted by class representatives in certified collective actions, potentially with some form of capped public funding or cost recovery mechanism tied to successful outcomes. This would help address the “informational mismatch” mentioned in the Stopford case judgment, though not explicitly in this one .
     • PPP: Collaboration between legal aid organizations, academic institutions, and potentially litigation funders, with some public seed funding, to create a resource center that provides initial assessments or support for data-intensive competition claims.

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HOW THE TRANSCRIPTS HELP OUR CASE

Based on the provided transcripts, several points strengthen the position of Ad Tech Collective Action LLP in your case ([2024] CAT 38) against Google. These learnings primarily come from discussions surrounding the U.S. Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Ad Tech case against Google and findings by other regulatory bodies, which show parallels to your allegations.

Here’s what was learned from the transcripts that strengthens your position:

1. Successful Monopolization Findings in Similar Markets (U.S. DOJ Case):

   • The U.S. District Judge in the DOJ’s Ad Tech case found that Google “willfully engaged in a series of anti-competitive acts to acquire and maintain monopoly power in the publisher ad server and the ad exchange markets for open web display advertising”. This directly aligns with your case’s focus on Google’s dominance and abusive conduct in similar ad tech markets, specifically concerning its publisher ad server (DFP) and its SSP/ad exchange (AdX).
   • The U.S. court agreed with the DOJ on market definitions for the publisher-side open web display ads (where Google offers DFP) and the ad exchange market (where Google offers AdX). This supports your definition of relevant markets where Google is alleged to be dominant.
   • Monopoly power in the U.S. case was established through high market shares (e.g., 91% for Google’s publisher-side product, 50-70% for its ad exchange), high barriers to entry, publisher “stickiness” despite degraded quality, and the failure of alternatives (like Meta’s attempt to enter the space). These are similar arguments you can leverage to demonstrate Google’s dominance in the UK.

2. Nature of Anti-Competitive Conduct (Self-Preferencing & Tying):

   • The U.S. DOJ case highlighted Google’s use of its “publisher ad server and its ad exchange together through connection contractual policies and technological interrogation which enable the company to establish and protect its monopoly power”. This mirrors your core allegations of Google’s DFP favoring AdX, AdX favoring DFP, and Google’s DSPs favoring AdX, constituting a strategy of self-preferencing.
   • The U.S. DOJ alleged that Google restricted real-time access to AdX to publishers that use DFP. This practice, which is central to your “First Abuse” and “Second Abuse” claims, was found to be unlawful tying by Judge Brinkema in the U.S. case. Professor Hovenkamp noted this tie as a “really important part of the case,” where Google leveraged AdX to gain an advantage in the separate publisher ad server market.
   • Practices like “last look” bidding (Google getting a privileged final bid opportunity) and “unified pricing rules” were also identified as anti-competitive in the U.S. context. Your expert, Dr. Latham, has identified similar mechanisms through which Google’s conduct harmed the class.

3. Harm to Publishers:

   • Professor Guggenberg explained that the U.S. DOJ successfully claimed that Google’s ad tech monopoly results in “less money ends up with publishers… because the middleman Google… takes a share that is way too large”. This directly supports your claims of “gross price effect” (depressed ad prices for publishers) and “take rate effect” (higher SSP commission charges).
   • The U.S. court noted that Google’s ad exchange maintained “super competitive” take rates that were not justified, corroborating your “take rate effect” argument.

4. Anticipating and Countering Google’s Defenses:

   • In the U.S. Ad Tech case, Google argued that its practices were justified by the need to protect consumer privacy and cybersecurity. The U.S. court reportedly “didn’t buy that,” viewing these as excuses. Similarly, regarding pro-competitive justifications for various rules (like stopping spam or ensuring platform security), the DOJ in the U.S. case was successful in demonstrating these were often pretextual. This provides you with insights on how to challenge similar justifications Google might raise in your case.
   • Google’s response to the UK CMA’s provisional adverse findings was that the case rested on “flawed interpretations of the adtech sector”. This is a defense you can anticipate and prepare to counter.

5. Corroboration from Other Regulatory Bodies (UK CMA):

   • A UK competition oversight group (the CMA) provisionally found that Google is “guilty of using its online platform dominance to restrict advertising competition for other UK publishers and advertisers”¹ and is “manipulating its unique position in the online advertising space to prioritize its own business interests over competitors”.² These provisional findings from a UK regulator, concerning the same company and similar conduct in the same jurisdiction, lend significant weight to your allegations.

6. Severity of Conduct and Potential for Strong Remedies:

   • The U.S. DOJ is seeking a “break up” of Google by forcing it to divest its AdX and DFP offerings as a remedy in its case. While your case is for damages, the fact that U.S. authorities are contemplating such structural remedies underscores the perceived severity and entrenched nature of the anti-competitive conduct, which can support the argument that the abuses have caused significant, widespread harm warranting substantial damages.

In summary, the transcripts reveal successful legal arguments and findings in the U.S. against Google on very similar grounds to your case, particularly regarding market definition, monopolization, the nature of self-preferencing and tying abuses in the ad tech stack, the resultant harm to publishers, and the weakness of Google’s justifications. Additionally, provisional adverse findings by the UK’s own CMA reinforce your position. This collective evidence should strengthen your arguments for the certification of your collective action and ultimately, for the merits of your claim.

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